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NEW DISEASES CALL FOR . . . ARCHAIC RESPONSES?
VIOLATING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE SANITARY
CORDON OF WUHAN

Madeline Young
Abstract
Public health measures in response to pandemics and human rights law are
both complementary and antithetical. Human rights law both requires public
health measures during pandemics through the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR") and limits such measures through
the InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"). However,
during pandemics States tend to impermissibly derogatefrom the ICCPR in favor
of the ICESCR. One public health measure, in particular, the sanitary cordon, is

nearly always violative of the ICCPR as being unjustifiably restrictive compared
to reasonably available alternatives.
This article discusses the concurrent development of public health policy and

human rights law, focusing on the sanitary cordon, an archaic public health
measure that has remarkably continued unscathed from the fourteenth century
through the twenty-first century. This article serves to evaluate the legality of
cordons and other public health measures used throughout history, culminating

in the largest sanitary cordon in recorded history in Wuhan, China during the
COVID-19 pandemic. Although China does not subscribe to the universal theory
of human rights, the Wuhan cordon nevertheless violated human rights laws,
leaving an accountability gap. Considering the moral underpinnings of human
rights law, China's actions beg the question of how "universal" human rights

are when consistent State practice seemingly delegitimizes them.
The first section details the history of the sanitary cordon and distinguishes it
from quarantine, another common response to epidemics. The second section
analyzes human right implications by historicaluses of sanitary cordons, with a

focus on the right to health, freedom of movement, freedom of association, and
the prohibitionon discrimination. The final section analyzes the largest sanitary
cordon in history in Wuhan, China in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and
explores the relationship between a universal theory of human rights and State
accountability.
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Introduction
On January 23, 2020, China enacted the most expansive public health measure
in recorded history as a response to the COVID-19 pandemic. At 2:00 am the
government of China gave notice, and at 10:00 am the city of Wuhan and its 11
million inhabitants were locked down under a police-enforced sanitary cordon.
This lockdown lasted 76 days. The cordon of Wuhan may be viewed as an applaudable public health measure that helped stem the spread of COVID-19 across
China and across the world; however, it may also be viewed as a draconian measure, implemented without scientific justification as a result of medical uncertainty and fear of the unknown. Both views can be true. However, it is crucial to
recall that human rights do not simply exist in time of peace and stability. Human
rights continue to exist during wars, during political instability, and during public
health crises. Governmental response in pandemics and epidemics must be evaluated not solely by their efficacy as a policy measure, but also within the context
of international human rights law. While some may regard China's cordon of
82
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Wuhan as a wise policy decision, this public health measure is not compatible
with universal human rights.
Public health measures and their relationship to international human rights law
are simultaneously complimentary and antithetical. International human rights
seek to maximize rights of the individual, while public health measures seek to
maximize the health of the overall population. Thus, while human rights require
public health measures to promote the health of individuals, public health measures often require permissible derogations or limitations on other human rights,
particularly the right to movement and freedom of association. Human rights law
allows both limitations of certain rights and broad derogations of rights only
when measures of proportionality and necessity are met. One public health measure in particular raises a number of human rights issues, the sanitary cordon.
The sanitary cordon is among the most archaic public health measures, which
almost inevitably impairs the essence of the human right at issue. A sanitary
cordon distinguishable from "quarantine" measures. While quarantine targets individuals presumed to carry a disease, or who have had contact with a person
who carries the disease, sanitary cordons target a geographical area, without any
individualized determination on whether the individuals in the area carry or have
had contact with the disease. Given the numerous alternative public health options, including individualized quarantine, a large-scale sanitary cordon rarely, if
ever, meets the necessary standards for a permissible limitation and derogation of
human rights law.
This paper will discuss the intersection between sanitary cordons and their
human rights implications beginning in the fourteenth century leading up to the
cordon of Wuhan-the largest sanitary cordon in recorded history. Additionally,
this paper considers the development of human rights law, and how State noncompliance in times of public health crisis serves to delegitimize the theory of
Universal Human Rights. Part I discusses epidemics and the violation of human
rights through sanitary cordons. A review of the development of public health
measures in relation to such epidemics will serve to provide context for evaluating modern-day public health measures. The sanitary cordon, developed in the
fourteenth century, has remarkably endured public health reforms and continues
to be implemented in the twenty-first century. While human rights did not exist
as we know them during earlier pandemics, they have since developed and impact every State through various conventions and binding customary international law. Human rights impacted during epidemics provide a framework for
evaluating the legality of public health measures.
Part II consists of historical case studies of the use of sanitary cordons emphasizing the human rights impacted in each case. The primary human rights issues
focused on in this paper include the right to health, freedom of movement, freedom of association, and the prohibition against discrimination. Part II seeks to
analyze public health measures of earlier epidemics and pandemics in light of
modern-day human rights standards. Case studies beginning in the 14th century
and continuing through current day illustrate the close relationship between public health and human rights as both progressed through history, including the
Volume 17, Issue 2
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concurrent development of human rights and international public health
regulations.
Part III focuses on a modern case study of the sanitary cordon of Wuhan. The
case study looks in depth at the COVID-19 pandemic and the measures China
adopted in Wuhan and the Hubei province in January 2020. Although human
rights have been established in the international community by 2020, China remains reluctant to submit itself to many standards either codified into treaties and
covenants or accepted customs by the international community at large. China's
attenuated history with human rights provides context for its aggressive public
health measures, culminating in the largest sanitary cordon in recorded history.
Regardless of whether China subscribes to human rights law, the sanitary cordon
of Wuhan far surpassed any permissible limitations on human rights. Through a
study of China, this paper attempts to reconcile how universal human rights can
exist within the harsh reality of perpetual State non-compliance, particularly in
situations of public health emergencies.
I. Epidemics and the Violation of Human Rights Through the Sanitary
Cordon
Public health decisions in epidemic control and human rights are intrinsically
connected. While public health considerations are essentially utilitarian, human
rights are deontological, which can put public health and human rights at odds. 1
Health policies can either promote or violate human rights through their design or
implementation. 2 One public health measure in particular has been criticized
through centuries for its emphasis on utility for the larger population at the expense of those impacted - the cordon sanitaire (or sanitary cordon). A sanitary
cordon is a large-scale quarantine effort, which seeks to quarantine an entire geographical area without any individualized analysis for those living within that
area. The following part will review the history of State public health response to
epidemics, the use of the sanitary cordon, and human rights implications arising
from public health decisions.
A.

How States React to Epidemics

State practice in response to epidemics has undergone massive practical and
theoretical changes since the Black Death in the mid-1300s. Public health measures established in medieval Europe were aimed at the management of social
order. 3 At the time, the primary goal of health legislation was to control the
mobility of the underclass thereby promoting social stability and protecting the
I Deontological ethics, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/deontological-ethics. (last visited May 21, 2020), (Deontological ethics place an emphasis on moral imperatives,
without consideration of the overall consequences of the action itself).
2 25 Questions and Answers on Health and Human Rights WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (2002),
https://www.who.int/hhr/information/25%2OQuestions%20and%2Answers%20n%2Health%20
and%20Human%20Rights.pdf.
3 DOROTHY PORTER, HEALTH, CIVIIZATION AND THE STATE: A HISTORY OF PUBLIC HEALTH FROM
ANCIENT TO MODERN TIMES 37 (1999).
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political status quo. 4 Traditional methods of disease control thus were directed at
decreasing mobility. Methods included travel restrictions based on origin location
as well as traveler status (i.e., merchants, minorities, and other unpopular
groups), restrictions on public gatherings, and establishment of a sanitary cordon
either by natural barriers or by military enforcement.5 Governments supported
these physical restrictions based on the contagion theories at the time, which first
supposed disease was spread by polluted air, but then transitioned to a person-toperson contagion model. 6
As a consequence of industrialization in the nineteenth century, epidemics began to occur with more frequency. 7 However, the accepted and previously successful public health measure of quarantine and isolation did not prove effective
to control nineteenth century diseases such as cholera. 8 As a result, controversy
raged through the 1800s between contagionists and anti-contagionists. 9 When
Yellow Fever appeared in Europe, both Spain and France immediately implemented quarantine restrictions along their borders.1 0 Anti-contagionists persuaded quarantine authorities in both States of the anti-contagious nature of
Yellow Fever, resulting in both States ultimately eliminating quarantine regulations.'' By the 1840s, anti-contagionist views dramatically reduced the use of
quarantine regulations used to combat cholera.' 2 Additionally, feudal public
health measures such as establishing sanitary cordons with military enforcement,
closing public meeting places, and sealing off cities, were politically impossible
to implement in the post-revolution European political environment.1 3 These restrictive measures that were considered commonplace in feudal Europe, were
rejected by radicalized nineteenth century ideals. 14 Moving away from quarantines, States began a sanitary reform which focused on clean provision of water,
effective sewage, and waste removal.' 5 States focused on preventative medicine
aimed at reducing chronic disease. Socialized health and sanitary measures
evolved, resulting in healthier living conditions for predisposed segments of the
population, such as the city-dwelling poor.16
4 Id.
5 See generally, Eugenia Tognotti, Lessons from the History of Quarantine,from Plague to Influenza A, 19 EMERGING INFECTIOUs DISEASEs 254, 255 (2013).
6 In the 1500s, the popular consensus about mechanisms of contagion switched from polluted air
causing spread to person-to-person contact, although actual epidemiology of disease was not known until
the late 1800s to early 1900s. PORTER, supra note 3, at 33-34.
7 Id.

at 77.

8 Id. at 79.
9 Id. at 81.
0 Id.
I Id.
12 Id.

13 Id. at 82.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 86.
16 Id. at 280.
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In addition to individual State practice, international efforts were made to
combat disease. International-led efforts began in the mid-1800s with the first
International Sanitary Conference in 1851." Nine additional conferences occurred in the nineteenth century, all of which failed to reach any tangible results,
largely due to the disagreements in disease epidemiology common during this
time period. 18 International Sanitary Conferences continued into the early 1900s,
eventually leading to the creation of the office international d'hygiene publique,
the first international health organization. 19 These efforts laid groundwork for the
creation of the World Health Organization ("WHO") in 1948.20 In 1951, the
WHO promulgated its first infectious disease prevention regulations: the International Sanitary Regulations. 2 1 The International Sanitary Regulations only addressed cholera, plague, relapsing fever, smallpox, typhus, and yellow fever. 22 In
1969 the WHO promulgated replacement regulations, the International Health
Regulations ("IHR"), which were intended to cover a broader ranges of disease,
this was later revised in 2005 as a response to the global SARS outbreak and is
the current legally binding instrument regarding public health and disease
prevention. 2 3

The IHR provides drastically different disease control mechanisms then those
that were used in feudal Europe and through the eighteenth century. The SARS
pandemic in 2003 highlighted the need to convert from a system of halting disease at national borders to a system which halts disease at its source. 2 4 IHR epidemic control regulations include such measures as reviewing travel history in
affected areas, requiring vaccination, placing suspected affected persons under
public health observation, implementing quarantine or isolation on affected persons, refusing entry of affected persons or refusing entry of unaffected persons to
affected areas, and implementing exit screenings and restrictions on persons leaving from affected areas. 25 The IHR emphasizes a need for "case-by-case" considerations which promotes the least restrictive, individualized measures to achieve
public health objectives. 26 As a result, modern quarantines differ significantly
from feudal quarantines. While feudal quarantines were based on a number of
17 Id. at 9.
18

Id.

19 NORMAN HOwARD-JONES, THE

SCIENTIFIC

BACKGROUND OF THE INTERNATIONAL SANITARY CON-

FERENCES 1851-1938, 9 (1974).
20

Id.

21 DAVID HAGEN, INTRODUCTION TO PANDEMIC INFLUENZA: CASE STUDY

1:

PORT HEALTH AND IN-

TERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS 195 (Jonathan Van-Tam & Chloe Sellwood eds., 2010).
22

Id.

23 NATIONAL ACADEMIES

OF SCIENCES,

FUTURE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES

24

60

ENGINEERING,

AND MEDICINE, GLOBAL HEALTH AND THE

(2017).

Id.

25 World Health Assembly: International Health Regulations, art. 18, 2509 U.N.T.S 79, (May 23,
2005) (hereinafter "IHR").
26 IHR, supra 25, at art. 23.
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factors unrelated to a person's actual health or likelihood of carrying disease,2 7
modern quarantines are only recommended in those circumstances where the individual himself is affected or has been in contact with an affected person.
The Sanitary Cordon

B.

Quarantines, and thus also sanitary cordons, are a type of nonpharmaceutical
interventions States implement during times of public health crisis. 2 8 Quarantine
restricts the movement of asymptomatic persons with possible exposure to a
communicable disease. 29 This differs from isolation, which restricts the movement of known infected persons for the period of communicability. 30 Because
quarantine directly involves those who are not infected, it is among the most
aggressive and controversial measures of controlling disease outbreak. 31 As previously discussed, quarantine is not a new health measure. While quarantine
gained popularity in the time of the Black Plague, its historical antecedents can
date back to the Old Testament, which mentioned quarantined with regard to

leprosy.32
Quarantine as a public health measure was a result of scientific uncertainty on
disease epidemiology. 33 In the times of the Black Death, quarantine lasted for
forty-days, which bore no relation to the incubation period of the disease. 34 The
use of quarantine became less common in twentieth century due to increased
understanding of disease communicability. 35 Such measures have not been used
on a large scale in the twentieth and twenty-first century until SARS in 2003,
Ebola in 2014, and COVID-19 in 2020.36 In each case, quarantine measures reflected medical uncertainty about the epidemiology and spread of the diseases.
While public health measures have grown through history, modern epidemics
illustrate an age-old pattern where unknown medical countermeasures result in
fear and extremely restrictive health measures which go beyond what is necessary or appropriate to control the disease. 37
Even more controversial than an individual quarantine is the sanitary cordon,
which limits the entry of every person into or out of a specific geographic area to
27 See, e.g., PORTER, supra note 3, at 34 (explaining how when plague appeared in Soncino Italy, all
travelers were banned from entering Milan); Tognotti, supra note 5, at 256 (explaining how prostitutes
and beggars were considered carriers of disease and regulations hindered their movements on this basis).
28 Mark A. Rothstein, From SARS to Ebola: Legal and Ethical Considerationsfor Modern Quarantine, 12 IND. HEALTrH L. Rrv. 227, 232 (2015); Howard Markel et al., Nonpharmaceutical Interventions
Implemented by US Cities During the 1918-1919 Influenza Pandemic, JAMA (2007).
29 Rothstein, supra note 28, at 227.
30

Id.

31 Id. at 232.
32 Id. at 229 (citing Leviticus 14:4).
33 Id. at 233.
34

Id.

35 Id.

Id. at 228.
37 Id. at 234.
36
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prevent the spread of disease. 38 Sanitary cordons were common during the era of
Black Death and continued to be used through the early 1900s with typhus. 39
Unlike an individual quarantine, the sanitary cordon applies regardless of an individual's likelihood of infection. Traditionally the sanitary cordon was implemented to prevent introduction of disease into a healthy population. For example,
the island nation Majorca set up a sanitary cordon around its borders during the
nineteenth century to prevent introduction of cholera from Europe. 40 However, a
sanitary cordon may also be established to seal off the borders of an area which is
infected in order to prevent those from inside the area from transmitting the disease to non-infected areas (a reverse sanitary cordon). 4 1 This particularly controversial variety of sanitary cordon was implemented in China during SARS, in
Liberia during Ebola, and most recently (and most aggressively) in the Hubei
province of China during COVID-19. 42
Large-scale sanitary cordons are typically a gross overreach from public health
authorities and have resulted in increased human rights implications. For example, Sierra Leone, as a response to the 2014 Ebola outbreak, imposed an areawide sanitary cordon covering one-fourth of the country, affecting over a million
people. 43 This can properly be viewed as a sacrifice of the few (the residents
cordoned in Sierra Leone) for the benefit of the many (the global community).
The sanitary cordon in Sierra Leone served to multiply the number of Ebola
cases. Ebola spread throughout the cordoned area of Sierra Leone due to a lack of
hospital beds, ambulances, and safe burial practices.4 4 By the end of 2014, Sierra
Leone had a documented total of 9,446 cases of Ebola and 2,758 deaths, more
than any other country. 45
Historical case studies during the early plague and cholera outbreaks show the
efficacy of sanitary cordons to prevent introduction of disease to an uninfected
area. During the plague, a sanitary cordon set up in Austria coincided with no
major outbreaks in Austrian territory, although this was potentially coincidental. 4 6 During the cholera epidemic, Sardinia was the only Italian region untouched by cholera as a result of a sanitary cordon guarded by armed men. 47
38 Id. at 235.

39 Donald McNeil, Jr., Using a Tactic Unseen in a Century, Countries Cordon Off Ebola-Racked
Areas, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/13/science/using-a-tactic-unseenin-a-century-countries-cordon-off-ebola-racked-areas.html#:-:text=the%20Ebola%20outbreak%20in%20
West,no%20one%20is%20allowed%20out.
40 Pere Salas-Vives & Joana-Maria Pujadas-Mora, Cordons Sanitairesand the RationalisationProcess in Southern Europe (Nineteenth-Century Majorca), 62 MED. HIST. 314, 318 (2018).
41 Rothstein, supra note 28, at 235.
42

Id.

43 Id. at 252.
44

Id.

45 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Ebola Response Roadmap Situation Report, (Dec 31, 2014),
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/146763/roadmapsitrep_31 Dec 14_eng.pdfsequence=1.
46 Gunter E. Rothenberg, The Austrian Sanitary Cordon and the Control of the Bubonic Plague:
1710-1871, 28 J. OF THE HisT. OF MED. AND ALLIED Sci. 15, 23 (1973).

47 Tognotti, supra note 5, at 256.
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Additionally, the sanitary cordon in Majorca led to only five occurrences of
epidemics in the region during the nineteenth century, and even in those cases,
only parts of the island were affected. 48 Although sanitary cordons have historically proved effective at decreasing the spread of disease, health experts do not
recommend them when less intrusive measures exist. Dr. Martin Cetron, Director
of the CDC's Division of Global Migration and Quarantine and Dr. Julius
Landwirth of Yale's Interdisciplinary Center for Bioethics stated, "principles of
modern quarantine and social distancing limit [sanitary cordon] use to situations
involving highly dangerous and contagious diseases and when resources are readily available to implement and maintain the measures." 4 9 Dr. Cetron and Dr.
Landwirth recommend social distancing measures such as closing schools and
limiting public gatherings before implementing a sanitary cordon. 50 Furthermore,
even when sanitary cordons are used, health officials must be prepared to ensure
that those cordoned are not placed at an increased risk by virtue of their sanitary
cordon. 5 1 While historical anecdotes support the theory that sanitary cordons are
effective in preventing spread into an uninfected area, it is unclear whether sanitary cordons are effective to prevent transmission of the disease out of a
cordoned infected area when the disease has already left the borders.
C.

Human Rights During Epidemics

The WHO requires that "all Network responses will proceed with full respect
for ethical standards, human rights, national and local laws, cultural sensitives
and traditions."52 Quarantines, of all the social distancing members, are the most
intrusive upon individual liberty. 5 3 In addition to restricting individual liberties,
one study during SARS showed significant psychological effects of quarantining. 54 The study showed high prevalence of psychological distress, finding
28.9% of the quarantined respondents displayed symptoms if PTSD (higher for
respondents under longer quarantines) and 31.2% of the quarantined respondents
displayed symptoms of depression. 55 Thus, the sanitary cordon, as more controversial form of quarantine, raises human rights and ethical considerations.
Human rights laws provide a framework for striking a balance between human
rights and necessary State action to mitigate the effects of epidemics. Failure to
act in response to an epidemic itself may be a violation of human rights law.
Thus, the balance of each defined right in the International Bill of Rights along
48 Salas-Vives, supra note 40, at 332.
49 Tognotti, supra note 5, at 257 (citing Martin Cetron & Julius Landwirth, Public Health and Ethical
Considerations in Planning for Quarantine, 78 YALE J. BIOLOGY & MED. 325, 326 (2005)).
50 Cetron & Landwirth, supra note 49.
51 Id.
52 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Guiding Principles for International Outbreak Alert and Response, www.who.int/csr/outbreaknetwork/guidingprinciples/en/ [http://perma.cc/99HV-4R791.
53 Rothstein, supra note 28, at 236.
54 Laura Hawryluck et al., SARS Control and Psychological Effects of Quarantine, Toronto, Canada,
10 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1206, 1206 (2004).
55 Id.
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with any permitted limitation or derogation for public health must be analyzed.
The International Bill of Rights is composed of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights ("UDHR"), the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights ("ICCPR"), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights ("ICESCR").56 While other human rights treaties exist, these are the most
relevant human rights impacted by public health measures.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights

1.

The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights on December 10, 1948.57 The UDHR is widely regarded as the
foundation of international human rights law. 58 While the UDHR itself is not
legally binding, it has been translated into law in the form of treaties, customary
international law, general principles, and through regional agreements and domestic law. 59 Today, every state is bound by at least one multilateral convention
concerning human rights. 60 Additionally, the widespread application of principles
from the UDHR provide support that some provisions of the UDHR have
evolved into international custom. A minority of scholars suggest the UDHR in
totality has evolved into customary international law, 6 1 but almost all scholars
would agree that portions of the UDHR are now customary international law due
its widespread and constant recognition. 62 The UDHR declares human rights as
universal, to be enjoyed by all people regardless of nationality. 63 The topics covered include a variety of negative and affirmative rights.64
56 Fact Sheet No. 2 (Rev.]), The International Bill of Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN
RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER (June 1996), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publica

tions/FactSheet2Rev.len.pdf [hereinafter OHCHR].
57 Id.
58 Human Rights Law, UNITED
human-rights-law/index.html.
59

NATIONS,

https://www.un.org/en/sections/universal-declaration/

Id.

60 Status of Ratification, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, (last
visited Dec. 6, 2020) (illustrating that the majority of States are parties to five or more international
human rights treaties with the exception of Bhutan, Niue, Palau, Tonga, and Tuvalu, which each have at
least one treaty ratified, but less than five).

61 Hurst Hannum, The UDHR in National and International Law, 3 HEALTH AND HUM. Ris. 144, 148
(1998); see also Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National
and International Law, 25:287 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 287, 324 (1995) (suggesting the first twenty-one
articles of the UDHR are customary international law).
62 Hannum, supra note 61; see also A.H. ROBERTSON & J.G. MERRILLS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE

27
(3d ed. 1989) ("The impact of the Universal Declaration has probably exceeded its authors' most sanguine expectations, while its constant and widespread recognition means that man of its principles can
now be regarded as part of customary law.").
WORLD: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

63 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec.
UDHR].
64

90
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InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights

Borne from the UDHR was the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
While the UDHR itself is not binding, both the ICCPR and ICESCR are international treaties, binding upon its State parties. The ICCPR was adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly on December 16, 1966 and entered into force
on March 23, 1976.65 As of mid-2020, 173 States are parties to the ICCPR. 66
Notable States which have not ratified the ICCPR include China, Saudi Arabia,
Singapore, South Sudan and the United Arab Emirates. 67 The ICCPR codifies
negative rights of the people to be free from arbitrary government intrusion. 68
Many of these rights were explicitly included in the UDHR. 69 The ICCPR includes the right to life, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and due process rights. 70
Some provisions of the ICCPR include limitation clauses, which allow the
right to be limited by regulations which are "necessary to protect. . . [public]
health." 7 1 General comments written by the Human Rights Committee provide
guidelines for restrictions on specific Articles. For example, Comment 27 on the
Freedom of Movement also provides guidelines for lawful restrictions on the
right to freedom of movement. 72 Restrictions must be provided by law, must be
necessary in a democratic society for the protection of public health, and must be
consistent with all other rights recognized in the ICCPR. 73 The General Comment emphasizes that the restrictions must not only be permissible, but must be
necessary to protect the goal of public health. 74 Additionally, restrictive measures
must be proportionate, in that they are appropriate to achieve the protective function and the least intrusive option to protect that function. 75
Article 4 of the ICCPR also expressly permits derogation of some rights in
situations of public emergency and for the protection of public health. Article 4
provides:
65 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter
ICCPR].
66 Status of Ratificationof the InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS
HUMAN RIGHTS OFIcE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, https://indicators.ohchr.org/.
67 Id.
68 Beth Simmons, Civil Rights in International International Law: Compliance with Aspects of the
"International Bill of Rights", 16 IND. J. GLolAI. LEGAL STuo. 437, 440 (2009).
69 UDHR, supra note 63, art. 3-21. Note that many of the articles of the UDHR suggested to have
evolved into customary international law are the same rights granted in the ICCPR. See Hannum, The
Status of the Universal Declarationof Human Rights in National and International Law, supra note 60,
at 324.
70 ICCPR, supra note 65, at art. 12.
71

Id.

72 U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 27: Article 12 (Freedom of Movement),
CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.9 (Nov. 2, 1999) [hereinafter General Comment 27].
73 Id. at I1.
74 Id. at 14.
75

Id.
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"In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and
the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the

present Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations
under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent
with their other obligations under international law and do not involve
discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, relig76
ion or social origin."

Article 4 expresses that derogation of certain articles is not permitted even in the
case of public emergency. 77 No derogation is permitted on the right to life, the
right to be free of torture and inhuman treatment, the right to be free from slavery
and the right to freedom of thought and religion. 78
Two guiding sources on further defining Article 4 of the ICCPR are the
Siracusa Principles and case law from human rights tribunals. 79 The Siracusa
Principles are a set of non-binding principles created by a group of non-governmental organizations in 1985, designed to provide guidance on the Article 4 the
ICCPR. 80 Article 4 limitations on ICCPR rights must meet the standards of (1)
legality, (2) in furtherance of a legitimate object of general interest (here, public
health), (3) strict necessity, (4) least intrusive means applied, and (5) restriction is
based on scientific evidence. 8 1 For public health objectives, the Siracusa Principles state that limiting measures must be "specifically aimed at preventing disease or injury or providing care for the sick and injured." 8 2
The European Court of Human Rights ("ECHR") typically rules on the European Convention of Human Rights rather than the ICCPR, but provides useful
guidance because the language of the European Convention is substantially similar to the language of the ICCPR. 83 The ECHR has defined "public emergency"
to mean one that is (1) actual or imminent, (2) its effects involve the whole
nation, (3) the continuance of organized life of the community must be
threatened, and (4) the crisis must be exception in that the normal restrictions
76 ICCPR, supra note 65, art. 4.
7 Idat art. 4 ("No derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs I and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 may be
made under this provision.").
78 Id. at arts. 6 - 8, 18(3) (While the right to freedom of thought and religion may not be derogated by
Article 4's public emergency exception, derogation is permitted under Article 18(2) which states, "Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law
and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms
of others.").
79 K.W. Todrys et al., Failing Siracusa: Government's Obligations to Find the Least Restrictive
Options for Tuberculosis Control, 3 PUB. HEALTH ACTION 7, 7 (2013).
80 Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the InternationalCovenant on

Civil and Political Rights, 1985 AM. Ass'N. FOR INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS [hereinafter Siracusa
Principles].

81 WHO Guidance on Human Rights and Involuntary Detention for xdr-tb Control, WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION (Jan. 24, 2007), https://www.who.int/tb/features-archive/involuntaryjtreatment/en/.
82 Siracusa Principles, supra note 80, at 25.

83 Convention for the Protection of Human
1950, Europ.T.S. No. 5; 213 U.N.T.S. 221
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permitted by the Convention for the maintenance of public health are plainly
inadequate. 84 Lawless v. Ireland, a foundational case defining the European Convention's Article 15 (the ICCPR's Article 4 counterpart), held that public emergency includes only "an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency which
affects the whole population and constitutes a threat to the organized life of the
community." 85 A declaration of public emergency is typically self-judging and
great deference is given to national authorities' assessment on whether such situation exists. 86 However, the court will rule on whether States have gone beyond
the "extent strictly required by the exigencies." 87 Two important judicial limitations courts have imposed on the utility of the derogation provision are: (1) the
crisis must not be regional, but must impact the whole population, 88 and (2) the
crisis should be so exceptional that normal measures permitted by the convention
for maintenance of public health are plainly inadequate. 89 In accordance with the
ECHR's rulings, the Human Rights Committee's General Comment 29 on derogations during a state of emergency states that "the possibility of restricting certain Covenant rights under the terms of, for instance, freedom of movement
(Article 12) or freedom of assembly (Article 21) is generally sufficient during
such situations and no derogationsfrom the provisions in question would be justified by the exigencies of the situation [emphasis added]." 90 Therefore, Article 4
general derogations for public emergency are not permissible to derogate from
Articles of the ICCPR which include limitation provisions.
3.

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

While the ICCPR codifies negative rights enumerated in the UDHR, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights codifies affirmative
rights. The ICESCR was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at the
same time the ICCPR was adopted, on December 16, 1966, but did not enter into
force until January 3, 1976.9' The ICESCR, like the ICCPR is widely followed.
As of mid-2020, 171 States are parties to the ICESCR. 92 Many of the States
which have not ratified the ICESCR are the same States which have not ratified
84 The ECHR defines "public emergency" in the context of the European Convention on Human
Rights rather than the ICCPR, but the language in both derogation provisions is identical. See The Greek
Case, 3321/67 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, § 153.
85 Case of Lawless v. Ireland (No. 3) 332/52 (A/3), 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 15, § 28.
86 Case of Ireland v. The United Kingdom, 5310/71 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, § 207.

87 E.g., Id.; Lawless v. Ireland, supra note 85, at § 36-38.
88 Id. at § 205 (a crisis impacting six out of twenty-six counties was sufficient to create a public
emergency); Case of Aksoy v. Turkey, 21987/93 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, § 70 (the extent and impact of terrorist
activity in South-East Turkey was sufficient to create a public emergency).
89 The Greek Case, supra note 84.
90 U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29: Article 4: Derogationsduring a State
of Emergency, CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add. l 1 5 (Aug. 31, 2001) [hereinafter General Comment 29].
91 ICCPR, supra note 65.
92 Status of Ratification of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER (Sept. 29, 2020), https://indicators.ohchr.org/.

Volume 17, Issue 2

Loyola University Chicago International Law Review

93

New Diseases Call For .

.

. Archaic Responses?

the ICCPR. 93 As a notable exception, China is a party to the ICESCR but has not
yet ratified the ICCPR, while the reverse is true for the United States. 94 Affirmative rights in the ICESCR include the right to health, education and an adequate
standard of living, along with labor rights. 95 Specifically related to human rights
during an epidemic, Article 12 articulates the right to enjoy the "highest attainable standard of physical and mental health," and provides that States should take
necessary steps for "the prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic,
occupational and other diseases." 9 6
Unlike the ICCPR, the ICESCR contains no express provision permitting derogation in situations of public emergency or in order to protect the public health.
Article 4 of the ICESCR includes generalized language which permits States to
subject limitations on ICESCR rights only so far as the laws are compatible with
the nature of the rights and "solely for the purpose of promoting the general
welfare in a democratic society." 97 In previous global emergencies, the UN Office of the High Commission for Human Rights has provided specific criteria to
assess the lawfulness of measures which contravene the goals of the ICESCR. 98
However the Office has not issued criteria in relation to global epidemic measures. 99 Without updated criteria, States may only rely on Article 4 of the
ICESCR, which has an inherently high threshold and is not self-judging.100
II. Historical Categorization of Human Rights Impacted by Sanitary
Cordon
While public health programs may violate human rights, they are also required
by human rights law to further the right to health. The right to health was first
articulated in the preamble to the World Health Organization Constitution in
1946, which states "the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is
one of the fundamental rights of every human being without distinction of race,
religion, political belief, economic or social condition." 10 1 In 1948, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") recognized the right to health, stating in
93

Id.

ICESCR in 1997 and ratified it in 2001, while it signed the ICCPR in 1998 but
has yet to ratify it. The United States signed the ICCPR in 1977 and ratified it in 1992, while it signed the
ICESCR in 1977 but has yet to ratify it. Id.
95 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter ICESCR].
96 Id. at art. 12.
97 Id. at art. 4.
98 See Report on Austerity Measures and Economic and Social Rights, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN
RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER (2013), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Development/RightsCrisis/E-2013-82 en.pdf.
99 Diane Desierto, CalibratingHuman Rights and Necessity in a Global Public Health Emergency:
Revive the UN OHCHR's ICESCR Compliance Criteria, EJIL:TALK! (Mar. 26, 2020), https://
www.ejiltalk.org/calibrating-human-rights-and-necessity-in-a-global-public-health-emergency-revivethe-un-ohchrs-icescr-compliance-criteria/.
94 China signed the

100 Id.
101 Constitution of the World Health Organization, Jul. 22, 1946, 14 U.N.T.S. 185.
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Article 25 that "everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the
health and well-being of himself and his family, including. . . medical care." 10 2
Less than twenty years later in 1966, Article 12 of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Culural Rights ("ICESCR") codified the right to health,
recognizing "the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of physical and mental health." 103 Article 12(2) provides steps to be
taken by State parties, including steps necessary to prevent, treat and control an
epidemic.104 The right to health may not be limited except by the provisions of
Article 4 of the ICESCR, which permits limitations on the rights only to the
extent the limitations would promote the general welfare in a democratic society. 105 General Comment 14 regarding the right to the highest attainable standard
of health emphasizes that limitations on the right to health provided in Article 4
must be (1) in accordance with the law (including international human rights
standards), (2) compatible with the nature of the rights in the ICESCR, (3) in the
interest of a legitimate aim, (4) strictly necessary for the promotion of the general
welfare in a democratic society, and (5) proportional, and (6) the least restrictive
means. 106
The right to health often triumphs over other human rights due the permissible
limitations of human rights for the purpose of public health. However, General
Comment 14 states that Article 2 of the ICESCR, relating to the right against
discrimination, may not be limited in pursuance of the right to health.1 07 In contrast, the right to freedom of movement and freedom of association and assembly
may be subject to restrictions for public health reasons. However, these restrictions must meet the requirements set forth in their respective articles. 108 When a
State declares a public emergency, general, non-article specific derogations of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") are permitted. "0
Article 4 derogations must meet even more restrictive requirements than the article-specific limitations, although need not be expressly for the purpose of advancing public health objectives. However, Article 4 is limited to derogate only
from rights which do not contain their own limitation provision. The use of sanitary cordon is potentially supported by the right to health but does so at an unjustifiable expense of other human rights. Below is an analysis of the freedom of
movement, freedom of association, and prohibition against discrimination and
102 UDHR, supra note 63, art. 25.

103 ICESCR,
104 Id. at art.
105

supra note 95, art. 12(1).
12(2)(c).

Id. at art. 4.

106 U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, CESCR General Comment No. 14: The
Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12), U.N. Doc., E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000)
[hereinafter General Comment 14].

107 Id. at 18.
108 Emergency Measures and COVID-19: Guidance, UNrTED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE
HIGH COMMISSIONER

(Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Events/EmergencyMeasures_

COVID I9.pdf.
109 Id.
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how historical uses of quarantine and sanitary cordons have violated, or in few
cases been in compliance with, each.
A.

Freedom of Movement

Freedom of Movement was initially announced in the UDHR and was subsequently codified in the ICCPR. 110 Article 13 of UDHR provides that "everyone
has the freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state" and
"everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and return to his
country." 111 Similarly, Article 12 of ICCPR provides that "everyone lawfully
within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty
of movement [emphasis added] and freedom to choose his residence", and "everyone shall be free to leave any country including his own." 1 2 Article 12 of the
ICCPR permits limitations on the right to freedom of movement for public health
purposes, therefore Article 12 may not be limited by Article 4 by virtue of having
its own limitation clause." 3 Article 12(3) allows for limitations which are (1)
proscribed by law, (2) necessary to protect public health, and (3) are consistent
with other rights recognized in the ICCPR.1 1 4
The European Court on Human Rights requires limitations on the freedom of
movement to be justified and proportionate from the outset and throughout its
duration." 5 In Vlasov and Benyash v. Russia, the ECH4R stated that a rigid and
automatic limitation, without an individualized assessment for each applicant,
could not be reconciled with the obligation to ensure the restriction was justified
and proportionate.1 16 The Human Rights Committee General Comment 27 provides that restrictions must be necessary and proportionate to achieve their protective function.' 17 The ECHR defines "necessary" to mean the measure
corresponds to a pressing social need that is proportional to a legitimate aim.' 18
A legitimate aim is one that is named in the limitation clause (i.e. public order
and public health). 119 In the case of an epidemic, a pressing social need and
legitimate aim are both met. However, establishing proportionality is more difficult. General Comment 27 further clarifies that to meet the principle of propor110 While the ICCPR has 167 parties, some argue that States which are not parties to the ICCPR are
nevertheless bound to the freedom of movement announced in the UDHR as a result of the formation of
customary international law. See Hannum, supra note 61, at 148.
111 UDHR, supra note 63, at art. 13.
112 ICCPR, supra note 65, at art. 13(1)-(2).
113 E.g., General Comment 29, supra note 90; The Greek Case, supra note 84.
114 ICCPR supra note 65, at art. 12(3), ("The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any
restrictions except those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public
order (ordre public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others and are consistent with
the other rights recognized in the present Covenant").
11 Case of Vlasov and Benyash v. Russia, 51279/09 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, § 32.
116 Id. at § 35-36; see also Case of Stamose v. Bulgaria, 29713/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, § 34 ("the Court
cannot consider such a blanket and indiscriminate measure to be proportionate").
117 General Comment 27, supra note 72, at 14.
118 W. v. the United Kingdom, 9749/82 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, § 60.
119 Id. at 61.
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tionality, measures must be the least intrusive option available.1 20 Glor v.
Switzerland similarly required that there be "no other means of achieving the
same end that would interfere less seriously with the fundamental right concerned."121 Large scale sanitary cordons rarely, if ever, meet the least intrusive
standard present both in case law and in commentary to the right. As discussed
earlier, individual quarantines are always a less intrusive option because individual quarantines take individual risk into consideration.

1. Early Epidemics: Plague and Cholera
Sanitary cordons always implicate the right to freedom of movement. During
the plague epidemics in the 1300s, sanitary cordons were imposed by armed
guards along transit routes and at access points to cities.1 2 2 Some cities prevented
strangers from entering the city borders, particularly strangers who they deemed
be high risk (such as merchants and minorities).1 23 When the plague appeared in
Soncino, Lombardy in 1398, travelers from Soncino were banned from entering
Milan.1 2 4 The ruler of Milan also created a sanitary cordon using River of Adda
as a natural barrier to stop all travelers at bridges and ports.1 2 5
Sanitary cordons are more often created to keep disease out of a geographic
area, but in some cases, they are also be used to keep disease in, preventing
further spread. In 1665, plague hit the village of Eyam in the United Kingdom.
As a response, the religious officials in the village drew a sanitary cordon along
the outskirt where no Eyam resident was allowed to leave and no traveler allowed into the village.' 26 As a result of this sanitary cordon, thousands of lives
were saved in the surrounding area, but an estimated 25-75% of the total population of Eyam died from the plague.1 27
The historical trend of restricting the freedom of movement as a first-response
method to public health crises continued in the 1800s as cholera spread around
Europe. In 1836, health officials in Naples prevented the free movement of transients such as prostitutes and beggars, who were believed to be carriers of disease.128 The island nation of Majorca installed a military cordon sanitaire in 1849
to prevent European travelers from bringing cholera to the island.1 2 9 However,
the use of quarantine and sanitary cordons decreased in the mid-to-late 1800s as
international preventative authorities evolved to place primary focus on sanitary
120 General Comment 27, supra note 72, at 14.
121 Case of Glor v. Switzerland, 13444/04 Eur. Ct. H.R. I, § 94.
122 Tognotti, supra note 5.

123 Id.
124

PORTER, supra note 3, at 34.
125 Id.
126 David McKenna, Eyam Plague: The Village of the damned, BBC NEws (Nov. 5, 2016), https://
www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-3506407 1.
127 Id. (260 Eyam residents were reported to have died due to the plague, while the total population of
Eyam was estimated to be between 350 and 800 people before the plague struck).
128 Tognotti, supra note 5.
129 Salas-Vives & Pajudas-Mora, supra note 40.
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surveillance and preventative measures of disinfection and isolation for only the
sick. 130

While the foundational human rights documents did not exist during the early
epidemics discussed, it is clear that the actions restricting freedom of movement
implemented in these times would be a violation of current human rights law
because they were discriminatory, not in pursuit of a legitimate aim, and not the
least restrictive option available. Article 2 of the ICCPR explicitly provides that
freedom of movement may not be restricted on the basis of social status, national
origin, religion, or race. 13 1 Public health responses to the plague and cholera both
involved prohibited discriminations, including discrimination on religion and
race (namely Jewish minorities) and social status (prostitutes, merchants, and
beggars). As discussed earlier, sanitary cordons were used during the plague, and
attempted in the early years of cholera, explicitly to decrease mobility of the
under-class and to advance the interests of the elite. 132 Limitations to the right to
movement require the measure to be proportionate to a legitimate aim.1 33 While
maintaining public health is a legitimate aim, decreasing mobility of the underclass is not. Additionally, sanitary cordons were often used as a first response to
outbreak despite failing to meet the requirement of being the least intrusive measure. Other measures such as timed quarantines (traditionally of forty days during
the plague-era) are less intrusive on the freedom of movement and should have
been the first public health response before more aggressive policies like the
sanitary cordon. 134
The village of Eyam is a unique example, properly viewed as a reverse sanitary cordon, where there was a sacrifice of the few to benefit the many. Human
rights law may have not existed in the 1600s, but today this sacrifice would be
examined with regards to the ICESCR right to health. While the sanitary cordon
may have saved thousands of surrounding villagers, the death toll of 25 to 75
percent of Eyam's population to achieve this goal would be a direct violation of
the Eyam villagers' right to health. We see a parallel situation in the 2019-2020
COVID-19 epidemic with the sacrifice of Wuhan China, which will be discussed
in Part III in relation to modern human rights laws.
Public health officials in the 1918 influenza epidemic utilized sanitary cordons
less frequently than in previous epidemics. However, some smaller-scale cordons
took place. For example, the city of Gunnison, Colorado, implemented a protective sanitary cordon around the entire county. 1 3 5 Unlike earlier measures, residents of Gunnison were permitted to leave the county freely, and individuals
130 Anne Hardy, Cholera, Quarantine and the English Preventive System, 1850-1895, 37 MED. HIST.
250, 251 (1993).
131 ICCPR, supra note 65, at art. 2.
132 PORTER, supra

note 3.

133 W. v. the United Kingdom, supra note 118.

134

Tognotti, supra note 5.

135 1918 Influenza Escape Communities: Gunnison, CENTER FOR THE HISTORY OF MEDICINE AT THE

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, http://chm.med.umich.edu/research/1918-influenza-escape-communities/gunnison/.
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who wished to enter were free to do so as long as they submitted to quarantine.136
American Samoa likewise implemented a sanitary cordon, using the Pacific
Ocean as a natural barrier, and refused entry to international travelers.' 37 All
ships arriving in the main point of Pago Pago were quarantined, and leaders created a blockade for any small-boat traffic traversing the international boundary
channel from Western Samoa, which had been infected.1 38 As a result of quarantine efforts, the 1918 influenza never made it to the population of American Samoa. 139 Both protective sanitary cordons would not be permissible under modern
human rights law. Neither were proportionate to the aim of maintaining public
health, which is evidenced by the exceedingly sparse use of sanitary cordons in
other areas of the world.
2.

Twenty-First Century Epidemics: SARS and Ebola

While quarantine use subsided in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the
use of quarantine returned to general public health practice during the 2003
SARS epidemic. China responded to SARS by installing police-enforced sanitary
cordons around buildings and organized road checkpoints.' 4 0 Some Chinese village-level governments imposed severe punishments for those who violated quarantine measures, including the death penalty. 141 Canada is another notable
country which instituted quarantine measures in response to SARS. Toronto public health authorities quarantined approximately 100 people per each confirmed
SARS case, which was at least twenty-five times more people than was appropriate as discussed below.' 42
By the SARS epidemic in 2003, the International Bill of Rights had been in
existence for close to forty years. China's police-enforced cordons of buildings
was consistent with human rights law. In contrast to previous sanitary cordons,
China's response to SARS was targeted to what was strictly necessary. For example, Chinese authorities quarantined Block E of Amoy Gardens, an apartment
complex, for ten days in response to 64 SARS cases registered from that housing
136 Id.

137 Peter Oliver Okin, The Yellow Flag of Quarantine: An Analysis of the Historical and Prospective
Impacts of Socio-Legal Controls Over Contagion, Graduate Theses and Dissertations 211-215 (2012),
https:/scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/4190.
138 Id.

139 Id.

140 Tognotti, supra note 5.
141 See e.g., Id.; China threatens Sars death penalty, BBC

NEws (May 15, 2003), http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3030069.stm; China Threatens the Death Penalty for Deliberately
Spreading SARS, L.A. TIMES (May 16, 2003), https://www.Iatimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2003-may-16fg-sarsl6-story.html; Sutirtoh Patranobis, SARS throwback: Anyone hiding, spreading virus could face
death in China, HINDUSTAN TIMES (Feb 5, 2020), https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/sarsthrowback-anyone-hiding-spreading-virus-could-face-death-in-china/story-3Np7TY L2uizDIS5MDJ6
CLhtml.
142 Richard Schabas, Severe acute respiratory syndrome: Did quarantine help?, 15 CAN. J. INFECTioUs DISEASES MED. MICROBIO.OGY 204 (2004).
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block.1 43 The quarantine was a harsh limitation the freedom of movement of the
individuals living in Block E but was necessary to pursue the legitimate aim of
protecting public health due to the large outbreak in that housing block. The
quarantine was also limited to only Block E, and for only ten days. Unlike the
limitation in Vlasov and Benyash v. Russia, the cordon of Block E was based on
an individualized assessment rather than an overly expansive and automatically
applied rule.144 Additionally, the cordon was the least restrictive option available
because it was limited only to residents of Block E, who may reasonably have
been believed to have had direct contact with the disease given the close proximity of apartments. The cordon was also carried in a non-arbitrary way, devoid of
any discrimination. These measures evidence an effective sanitary cordon which
was limited to what was strictly necessary and to what was the least restrictive
means. The key to the legality of this sanitary cordon was its small-scale application, to a targeted apartment block rather than a large geographic scale.
However, the death penalty as a punishment implemented as punishment for
violating quarantine measures in some Chinese villages briefly mentioned above
may be in violation of Article 6 of the ICCPR, which provides that "no one shall
be arbitrarily deprived of his life" and the death penalty "may be imposed only
for the most serious crimes."1 45 It is possible that the use of the death penalty for
violating quarantine would be an impermissible violation of human rights. Article 6 of the ICCPR contains no limitation provision, and Article 4 of the ICCPR,
which allows derogation in time of public emergency, explicitly excludes Article
6 from the scope of permissible derogation.1 46 Furthermore, the Second Optional
Protocol to the ICCPR, which was adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly
resolution in 1989, serves to abolish the death penalty for member States. 147 It is
relevant to note that at 2003, China had neither ratified the ICCPR nor signed or
ratified the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR.1 4 8
In contrast, the Canadian quarantine is more questionable as it relates to
human rights. Canada ratified the ICCPR in 1976, and thus is bound by the right
to freedom of movement and its permissible limitations found in Article 12.
Quarantine generally is permissible under Canadian law under the Canadian federal Quarantine Act and Quarantine Regulations, which list certain dangerous
diseases quarantine officers may detain.1 4 9 In June 2003, the Canadian government amended the Quarantine Regulations to include SARS and provided appro143 Thomas Crampton, As SARS rages, Hong Kong orders a quarantine, N.Y. TIMEs (Apr 1, 2003),
https://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/01/news/as-sars-rages-hong-kong-orders-a-quarantine.html.

144 Vlasov and Benyash v. Russia, supra note 115.

145

ICCPR, supra note 65, at art. 6(1)-(2).
146 Id. at art. 4(2) (No derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs I and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 may be
made under this provision").
147 Second Optional Protocol to The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at
the Abolition of the Death Penalty, Dec. 15, 1989, A/RES/44/128.
148 As of December 2020, China had still not ratified the ICCPR nor signed or ratified the Second
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR.
149 Nola M. Ries, Quarantine and the Law: The 2003 SARS Experience in Canada (A New Disease
Calls on Old Public Health Tools), 43 ALBERTA L. REv. 529, 534 (2005).
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priate notice to the World Health Organization ("WHO") of the updated
regulation, which meets the requirement of Article 12(3) to be proscribed by
law.' 5 0 Additionally, there is no evidence the quarantine was imposed in a discriminatory manner' 5 1 or any other manner that would implicate other rights recognized in the ICCPR, which meets the requirement that limitations be consistent
with other rights. However, Article 12(3) also requires the measure taken to be
necessary to protect public health. Necessity requires a pressing social need and
measures that are proportionate to a legitimate aim.15 2 The emergence of SARS
is clearly a pressing social need, and the measures taken were in furtherance in
public health, a legitimate aim. However, the quarantine regulations, although
less restrictive than a sanitary cordon, nevertheless failed to meet limitation requirements of Article 12(3). Studies show that the amount of people quarantined
could have been far more than necessary, which would defeat any finding of
proportionality. One study explains that the SARS quarantine in Toronto was
both inefficient and ineffective due to its scale.' 5 3 Toronto health authorities
quarantined 100 people per each confirmed SARS case, compared to only 12
people per each SARS case in Beijing.' 5 4 The Toronto quarantine could have
been less restrictive and more effective by quarantining only those who had contact with an "actively ill SARS patient." 1 55
The importance of necessity is better understood when considering the impact
these restrictions have on individuals. A Toronto study showed that every respondent experienced a sense of isolation due to the lack of physical contact with
family members and other members of society.' 56 The study found that "confinement within the home or between work and home, not being able to see
friends, and not being able to shop for basic necessities of everyday life. . . enhanced their feeling of distance from the outside world."1 57 While it may be easy
to consider human rights simply in black and white terms of meeting (or not
meeting) standards set forth in treaties, recalling the ethical imperatives and considerations that lead to development of human rights treaties to begin with must
be preserved in any discussion regarding limitations of human rights for the socalled "greater good."
The most recent, and until COVID-19, most drastic sanitary cordon in recorded history was implemented in response to the 2014 West African Ebola
Virus Disease (Ebola). On July 31, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone announced
a sanitary cordon of an area which contained more than 70% of the world's Ebola
150 Id.

151 Id.

at 533.
152 w. v. the United Kingdom, supra note 118.

153

Schabas, supra note 142.

154 Id.
155 Efficiency of Quarantine During an Epidemic of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome - Beijing,
China, 2003, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (CDC) (Oct 31, 2003), https://
www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5243a2.htm.
156 Ries, supra note 149, at 540.

157
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cases. 158 Additionally, on August 24, 2014, the government of Liberia imposed a
sanitary cordon on the West Point section of Monrovia. 159 The sanitary cordon in
West Point was enforced by barbed wire and wooden barricades, effectively containing 70,000 people.160 People living in the slum of West Point rioted, leading
to the death of a teenager, who was shot and killed by troops enforcing the sanitary cordon.1 6 1 Travel restrictions in both sanitary cordons produced a humanitarian crisis resulting from disruption of food transportation and lack of appropriate
health care.16 2 Bintu Sannoh, a victim of the Sierra Leone Ebola quarantine elaborated that young girls were forced to sneak out of their quarantine to sleep with
men in exchange for food.16 3 Sannoh expressed that the Ebola pandemic was
worse than war, stating:
"For me, the worst is quarantine: it means prison.

.

. There is no war but

men with guns and uniforms stand outside the homes of your friends. One
day, there were soldiers outside my own house... Like most in Kenema,
we are poor and hardly ever have more than a few days of food in the
house - then you are suddenly trapped for 21 days."164

These cordons were a gross violation of human rights in a misguided, utilitarian effort to spare the global community. Like the Eyam plague sanitary cordon,
the measures taken in Western Africa aimed to keep the infection in a geographic
area, rather than to keep the disease out of its borders. As a result, both the Eyam
plague sanitary cordon and the sanitary cordon in Western Africa resulted in
increased infection rates in the quarantined area.1 65 However, even more egregious than in Eyam, the sacrifice of the cordoned off African slums potentially
resulted in a higher overall global level of Ebola.166 While neighboring locals
may have been "saved" from the ravages of Ebola, the quarantined areas suffered
28,600 cases and over 11,000 deaths.1 67
Although none of Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia are parties to the African
Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, all are parties to the ICCPR, and are thus
bound to Article 12 regarding freedom of movement. The primary concerns with
158 See e.g., Ebola-hit African states seal off outbreak epicentre, MEDICAL XPRESS (Aug 1, 2014),
https://medicalxpress.com/news/2014-08-ebola-hit-african-states-outbreak-epicentre.html; Baltazar Espinoza et al., Mobility restrictionsfor the control of epidemics: When do they work?, 15 PLOS ONE 1, 1
(2020).
159 Amesh Adalja, Quarantiningan entire Liberian slum to fight Ebola is a recipefor disaster, WASH.
POST (Aug 28, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2014/08/28/quarantining-an-entire-liberian-slum-to-fight-ebola-is-a-recipe-for-disaster/.
160 Id.
161 Id.

162 Espinoza, supra note 158, at 2.
163 Bintu Sannoh, Ebola has almost gone, but life is still desperate in Sierra Leone, THE GUARDIAN
(Oct 17, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/oct/18/sierra-leone-ebola-aftermathwest-help-needed.

164 Id.
Espinoza, supra note 158, at 10.
166 Id.
165

167 Id.
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the sanitary cordons enacted in Western Africa during the Ebola pandemic are
related to necessity and consistency with other rights in the ICCPR, particularly
the right to be free from discrimination on the basis of socioeconomic status.1 68
Article 12(3) requires any limitation on the freedom of movement to be necessary
to protect public health. 169 The West African Ebola cordon was not necessary to
protect public health because it failed to be proportionate as it was not the least
intrusive instrument to achieve the desired result.170 Joseph Amon, health and
human rights director at Human Rights Watch stated that a better approach would
be to "ensure that people have access to health information and care, and to
restrict liberty or movement only if and when absolutely needed and with the
protections outlined under international human rights law." 17 1 The quarantine
lead to a humanitarian crisis that potentially exacerbated the public health crisis,
as discussed below.172
One study conducted using data from the West African Ebola outbreak found
that lower relative mobility of people in high risk communities, such as those in
the West African Ebola cordons, resulted in largeroverall epidemic size.1 7 3 The
study found that mobility restrictions in communities with low-risk of infection
may be effective in reducing the overall epidemic size, however often at the
expense of high-risk communities. 174 When population density is higher in the
high-risk community than the low-risk community, then movement from the
high-risk to low-risk community is likely to reduce the final overall epidemic
size, although it may result higher infection levels in the low-risk community. 175
Because the sanitary cordon potentially served to exacerbate the levels of Ebola
infections, its limitation on the right to freedom of movement cannot be justified
as necessary. Although one could argue that the sanitary cordon protected the
public health of individuals outside of the barricades, public health must be
viewed holistically and may not impute more human value on one set of people
than another. Furthermore, human rights are measured on an individual basis and
do not permit excessive limitations even when in pursuit of a noble goal.
The West African Ebola cordons may also be prohibited by Article 12(3) by
violating other rights recognized by the ICCPR, namely the right to be free from
discrimination. 176 The sanitary cordon imposed in Monrovia is potentially dis168 ICCPR, supra note 65, at art. 2. (Socioeconomic status may be considered under "or other status"
described in Article 2(1)).
169 Id. at art. 12(3).
170 Restrictive measures must be the least intrusive instrument to achieve the desired result. Individualized quarantine is always a less restrictive measure available, making the necessity of an area-wide
quarantine suspect in nearly every situation. See General Comment 27, supra note 72, at 14.
171 West Africa: Respect Rights in Ebola Response, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Sep 15, 2014), https://
www.hrw.org/news/2014/09/ 15/west-africa-respect-rights-ebola-response#.
172 Espinoza, supra note 158, at 10.
173 Id. ("Risk of infection" is determined by community attributes that include income, education,
health-care access, and cultural practices).
174 Id.

1?5 Id.
176 ICCPR,

supra note 65, at art. 2.
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criminatory on the basis of socioeconomic status. Although the ICCPR does not
explicitly protect poverty, it does protect discrimination based on "other status." 177 Additionally, poverty and discrimination are often intrinsically linked. 17 8
For example, the United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner explains that discrimination is both a cause and consequence of poverty
and that discrimination on the basis of poverty is widespread and widely tolerated. 179 West Point, the area cordoned, is a slum where the most vulnerable and
marginalized groups are among the poorest, including children, women and dis180
abled persons.
B.

Freedom of Association

A second area of human rights frequently violated by public health measures
is freedom of association. Article 20(1) of the UDHR provides that "everyone
has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association." 18 1 The ICCPR
codified this right in Article 18, which codifies freedom of assembly as it relates
to religious functions, Article 21, which codifies the right to peaceful assembly,
and Article 22, which codifies freedom of association with others.1 8 2 Each of the
three codifications of freedom of association contain a limitation provision,
which allows restrictions which the standards of being (1) proscribed by law, (2)
necessary in a democratic society, and (3) in the interest of public health. Because each Article contains its own limitation clause, freedom of association may
not be limited by Article 4 in cases of public emergency.1 8 3 Like the freedom of
movement, the Human Rights Committee requires restrictions on the right to
assembly conform to strict tests of necessity and proportionality.1 84 The restriction must be the least intrusive measure available.1 85 The ECHR applies the same
standards for limitations on the freedom of movement as it does for the freedom
177 Id.
178 Discrimination, Inequality, and Poverty - A Human Rights Perspective, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
(Jan 11, 2013), https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/01/1 1/discrimination-inequality-and-poverty-humanrights-perspective.
179 Guiding Principles on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, OHCHR 1 18 (Sep 2012).
180 YMCA Summary Report, The Ebola Outbreak in Liberia: Young People's Needs in the West Point
Slum, Y CAI INT'L (Sep. 2014), http://www.ycareinternational.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/TheEbola-outbreak-in-Liberia-Young-peoples-needs-in-the-West-Point-slum.pdf.
181 UDHR, supra note 63, at art. 20.
182 ICCPR, supra note 65, at art. 18 ("Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and
freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public [emphasis added] or private, to
manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching); see ICCPR, supra 65, at
art. 21 ("The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those imposed in conformity with the law and which are necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of.. . public health."); ICCPR, supra 65, at art. 22 ("Everyone shall
have the right to freedom of association with others ... ").
183 Id. at art. 4.
184 UN Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 37 on Article 21 - on Right of peaceful assembly, CCPR/C/GC/37 (Jul 23, 2020) (hereinafter General Comment 37).
185 Id. at 1 40.
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of association, including requirements for a pressing need, proportionality, and a
legitimate aim.
Mandatory quarantine and implementations of sanitary cordons implicate freedom of association indirectly, as those who are quarantined to their homes are
unable to attend any public gathering, regardless of whether public gatherings
themselves are targets of regulations. The human rights considerations for quarantine and sanitary cordon which indirectly impact freedom of association and
assembly are analyzed under a similar framework to that of the freedom of movement discussed above. Prohibiting public gatherings separately from a quarantine
was also a public health tool utilized in early epidemics. The legality of these
tailored public health measures, which only impact the freedom of association
and assembly, must be analyzed separately because restrictions on public gathering are less intrusive than quarantines and sanitary cordons and are more likely to
meet the necessity requirement.

1. Early Epidemics: Plague, Cholera, and Influenzas
During the plague epidemics of the fifteenth though seventeenth centuries,
public health authorities often banned public events in an effort to prevent the
spread of disease. In 1493, the public health committee in Florence banned markets, festivals, and processions in the city in addition to posting guards outside
the city to prevent travelers from entering. 186 In 1633, health magistrates in Florence once again took action against the freedom of association by preventing
religious assemblies. 18 7 Efforts to prevent religious assembly were met with hostile pushback from church authorities, who believed that only through prayer
would the disease abate. 188 For example, local church authorities in Monte Lupo,
Florence defied health ordinances by staging a procession of devotion to the crucifix, igniting popular resistance to quarantine efforts. 189 Health authorities justified the measures as necessary to prevent the person-to-person spread of plague.
However, the primary goal was to maintain social stability.1 90 Civil authorities
supported the health authorities in local conflicts with the civilian population and
with the church using armed force when necessary.191
Similarly, public health authorities responded to the early threat of cholera in
1831 with plague-era procedures by closing public meeting places.1 92 For example, Falun, Sweden banned all gatherings, including private gatherings and gatherings in taverns and inns,1 93 and France proscribed fairs and markets to avoid
186 PORTER, supra note 3, at 36.
187 Id. at 37-38.
188 Id. at 38.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 37.

191 Id. at 38.

192

Id. at 87.
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the spread of cholera. 194 However, plague-era methods for controlling disease
proved ineffective to control cholera, 195 which was spread through the environment (contaminated water) rather than person-to-person contact (such as air droplets as was the case for the plague). 196 Public health focus switched from
mobility restrictions to environmental reform. 19 7
Influenza, as opposed to cholera, spread through airborne respiratory secretions, which brought back a need for mobility restrictions. 198 The Paris-based
office international d'hygiene publique, an international health organization established in 1907, published epidemic mitigation techniques for limiting the
spread of influenza.1 99 Mitigation techniques included municipal bans on public
gatherings such as meetings, church services, and theater performances. 200 As a
result, during the 1918-1919 influenza outbreak, health authorities in major cities
in the Western world closed schools, churches, theaters and suspended public
gatherings. 201 Similar public health measures were enacted in Indochina to restrict public gatherings. 202
Although the ICCPR did not enter into force until 1976, public health regulations such as those used in response to the plague, cholera, and influenza would
nevertheless be justified under modern human rights law. Articles 18, 21 and 22
permit limitations on the right of assembly and association that are necessary and
in the interest of public health. 203 Certainly, preventing large social gatherings in
the midst of the plague and influenza, both highly contagious diseases, meets the
requirement of a pressing social need. Additionally, restricting public gatherings
is significantly less restrictive than a sanitary cordon or forced quarantine, which
supports a finding of proportionality. There is no other public health measure to
prevent large groups of people from meeting that would be as effective as banning public gatherings in totality. Plague and influenza regulations limiting public gatherings thus meet the requirement of necessity. These regulations also meet
194 Id. at 92.
supra note 3, at 80.
196 Silvio Daniel Pitlik, M.D., COVID-19 Compared to Other Pandemic Diseases, 11 RAMBAM MAIMONIDES MED. J. (2020); Didier Raoult et al., Plague: History and contemporary analysis, 66 J. OF
INFECTION 18, 20 (2013).
197 PORTER, supra note 3, at 93.
198 Influenza pandemic of 1918-19, ENCYCLOPWDIA BRITANNICA (Jul. 7, 2020), https://
www.britannica.com/event/influenza-pandemic-of-1918-1919 (Note that air droplets were also one
mechanism through which the plague spread from person-to-person); Raoult, supra note 195.
199 David M. Morens et al., An Historical Antecedent of Modern Guidelines for Community Pandemic
Influenza Mitigation, 124 PUB. HEALTH REP. 22 (2009).
200 Id. at 23.
201 For example, Paris authorities postponed a sporting event drawing 10,000 French youths and Italian public health authorities closed schools after the first case of hemorrhagic pneumonia. Tognotti,
195 PORTER,

supra note 5.

&

202 KRISTY WALKER, THE INFLUENZA PANDEMIC OF 1917 IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, IN HISTORIES OF
HEALTH IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: PERSPECTIVES ON THE LONG TWENTIETH CENTURY 61-71 (Tim Harper

Sunsil S. Amrith eds, 2014).
203 These Articles also require the restriction to be proscribed by law, however the monarchical governing structure in Europe during the plague and cholera make analysis of the proscribed by law requirement beyond the scope of this discussion.
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the requirement of a legitimate aim. The subjective intent of officials implementing plague-restrictions may have been questionable, but the regulation itself is
seemingly in the interest of public health and tends to support the administration
of public health through limiting spread of disease. Influenza regulations even
more than during the plague had no obvious ulterior motive other than preventing
the spread of disease pursuant to the recommendations of international health
organizations.
While prohibiting gatherings in response to cholera was not as effective, the
restriction may nevertheless be considered necessary. The ECHR interprets "necessity in a democratic society" to mean whether the restriction corresponded to a
pressing social need, whether it was proportionate to the aim pursued and
whether the justifications for the restriction are relevant and sufficient. 20 4 Cholera
represented a pressing social need, and limitations on public gathering are proportional because the limitations on freedom of association and assembly are not
overly restrictive when balanced against the high social need of preventing the
spread of disease. Additionally, justifications supporting the restrictions were relevant and sufficient given the historical context (although in hindsight were misguided). The ECHR requires limitations to be justified and proportionate from
the outset and throughout its duration. 205 At the time of the cholera public gathering restrictions, the unique epidemiology of cholera was not yet known and all
that was known was such restrictions had been effective in the past to control
previous epidemics. Once public health officials realized mobility restrictions
were not effective to combat cholera, the justification for such restrictions
ceased, as did the restrictions themselves.
2.

Twenty-First Century Epidemics: SARS and Ebola

More recent epidemics also used direct limitations to the freedom of association through social distancing measures. Public health interventions in response
to the 2003 SARS epidemic included canceling mass gatherings and closing
schools. 206 Likewise, during the 2014 West Africa Ebola Virus epidemic, Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone issued emergency declarations which required closures of public spaces, including schools and markets. 207 Liberia and Sierra
Leone also banned mass gatherings. 208 These Ebola measures were widely accepted as appropriate, and were supported by the WHO itself, which recommended States with Ebola transmission postpone mass gatherings. 209
§ 62. (1979).
205 Vlasov and Benyash v. Russia 51279/09 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1.
206 David M. Bell and World Health Organization Working Group on Prevention of International and
Community Transmission of SARS, Public Health Interventions and SARS Spread, 2003, 10 EMERGING
INFEcTIOUS DISEASES 1900 (2004).
207 Preeti Emrick et al., Ebola Virus Disease: internationalperspective on enhanced health surveillance, disposition of the dead, and their effect on isolation and quarantinepractices, 2 DISASTER AND
Mii. MEn. (2016).
208 Id.
204 Sunday Times v. UK, App. No. 6538/74, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep.245,

209 Statement on the 1st meeting of the IHR Emergency Committee on the 2014 Ebola Outbreak in
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (Aug 8, 2014).
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Both the public gathering limitations imposed during SARS and during Ebola
were consistent with human rights obligations. Although the public gathering
limitations would typically be in violation of various rights to assembly and association found in the ICCPR, limitations in public health emergencies are permitted. Articles 18, 21 and 22 all permit limitations which are proscribed by law,
necessary, and in the interest of public health. Assuming the regulations were
legally proscribed, both epidemic responses are permissible limitations. Public
gathering limitations were necessary to prevent the spread of SARS and Ebola.
To evidence the necessity, the WHO itself recommended such measures. While
WHO guidance may not be dispositive to a finding of legality, they reflect a level
of international acceptance of the necessity and proportionality of such recommended measures. Additionally, the public gathering limitations were in pursuit
of the legitimate aim of public health by seeking to prevent spread of disease.
However, as previously discussed, public health responses to both SARS and
Ebola also included quarantine and sanitary cordon, which are indirect limitations on the freedom of association and assembly due to restricting movement,
thereby making it impossible to assemble. Like Article 12 of the ICCPR, Articles
18, 21 and 22 require necessity and proportionality, defined as the least intrusive
restriction available.2 1 0 As discussed under freedom of movement, sanitary cordons are rarely the least restrictive option available. One alternative option is the
public gathering limitations discussed in this section, which are considerably less
intrusive on a person's liberty interests. Because other alternatives are widely
available to prevent large gatherings, implementation of a sanitary cordon to
achieve this goal violates the freedom of association and assembly in the same
manner these measures violated the freedom of movement. China's SARS cordon measures were consistent with human rights law because they were limited
to what was strictly necessary and what was the least restrictive means to prevent
residents of Block E from spreading disease by assembling with others. In contrast, Canada's SARS quarantine was not proportionate to the threat, making the
measure a violation of both the right to freedom of movement and the rights to
freedom of association and assembly. The West African Ebola sanitary cordons
also violated the ICCPR because they were not the least restrictive measure available to achieve the goal of preventing spread by assembly. A better solution in
Canada and West Africa would have been to quarantine only those ill or who had
contact with someone ill, or to enact public gathering restrictions, both of which
are less restrictive and equally effective public health measures.2 11
C.

Prohibition Against Discrimination

The right against discrimination is also sometimes impacted by public health
measures. Article 2 of the UDHR states "[e]veryone is entitled to all the rights
and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such
as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
General Comment 37, supra note 184.
Refer to the Freedom of Movement section for the in-depth analysis on these sanitary cordon
measures.
210
211
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social origin, property, birth or other status." 2 12 Article 2(1) of the ICCPR and
Article 2(2) of the ICESCR codify the right against discrimination on the same
terms as the UDHR. 213 The ECHR defines "other status" to include only differences based on an "identifiable characteristic." 2 14 The Human Rights Committee
recognizes that not every differentiation of treatment will constitute discrimination. 2 15 General Comment 18 states that differentiated treatment is permissible "if
the criteria for such differentiation are reasonable and objective and if the aim is
to achieve a purpose which is legitimate under the Covenant." 2 16 The ECHR
explains that treatment has no objective and reasonable justification when it does
not pursue a legitimate aim or there is no reasonable relationship of proportionality between means employed and the legitimate aim. 217 The test for permissible
discrimination thus matches the test for limitations on the rights to freedom of
movement and freedom of association. To be permissible, discrimination must
therefore be (1) not a protected status, or (2) necessary in furtherance of a legitimate aim and proportionate to that aim.
However, some characteristics receive additional protection. Article 4 of the
ICCPR expressly prohibits a State's ability to restrict the right against discrimination on the basis of race, colour, sex, language, religion, or social origin, in
time of public emergency. 2 18 Any other discrimination provided for in Article
2(1) of the ICCPR (e.g. discrimination on the basis of political opinion, property,
or other status) may be limited by Article 4 so long as the standards are met for
such derogation. 2 19 Unlike the ICCPR, the ICESCR does not contain a provision
which permits derogations of rights for public emergency. Article 4 of the
ICESCR states that limitations on rights codified in the ICESCR must be (1)
provided by law, (2) compatible with the nature of the rights, and (3) solely for
the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society. 220 While a
declaration of public emergency under Article 4 of the ICCPR is generally selfjudging, no such self-judging standards exists in Article 4 of the ISESCR, which
creates a higher threshold to meet. 2 21
212 UDHR, supra note 63, at art. 2.
213 ICCPR, supra note 65, at art. 2(1); ICESCR, supra note 95, at art. 2(2).

1, ¶ 134 (2020).
215 UN Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 18: Non-discrimination, UN Doc
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9, at 1 13 (Nov 10, 1989).
214 Molla Sali v. Greece, 20452/14 Eur. Ct. H.R.

216

Id.

217 Fabris v. France, 2013-I, Eur. Ct. H.R. 381, at

¶56.

218 ICCPR, supra note 65, at art. 4 ("In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation
and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the State Parties to the present Covenant may take
measures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by
the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex,
language, religion or social origin").
219 See Section I for a discussion on the Siracusa Principles of limitations on rights in the ICCPR.
220 ICESCR, supra note 95, at art. 4.
221 Desierto, supra note 99.
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Discriminationon the Basis of Race

1.

Discriminatory public health measures were particularly common prior to the
advent of the International Bill of Human Rights. In the plague era, Jewish people in particular were frequently discriminated against. Christians in eastern Europe considered the plague to be the wrath of god punishing humans for their
sin.222 Throughout Southern France, Spain, Switzerland and southern Germany,
Christians blamed Jewish people for the plague and responded by burning hundreds of Jewish neighborhoods as well as imprisoning and torturing Jewish people. 223 Additionally, sanitary cordons imposed by armed guards prevented Jewish
people from entering cities. 224
Racially discriminatory public health measures remained popular into the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 225 For example, in 1892 four people from a
boat which carried many Russian Jewish immigrants to New York City were
found to be infected with typhus. 2 2 6 New York City health officials ordered quarantine of 1,200 Jewish Russians who happened to live near the four infected. 227
Italian immigrants who arrived on the same boat were detained for a lesser
time. 2 28 To evidence the pervasive xenophobic and antisemitic attitude at the
time, the front page of the New York Times stated; "We don't need this kind of
riff-raff on our shores," referring to the Jewish Russians. 229 In 1900, shortly after
the New York City cholera quarantine, other cities in the United States implemented racist public health policies. To combat the spread of bubonic plague in
the 1900s, the city of San Francisco prevented all Chinese residents who did not
get a plague vaccination from leaving the city. 230
Each of these early public health measures would violate modern-day human
rights law. Article 2(1) of the ICCPR and Article 2(2) of the ICESCR prohibit
discrimination on the basis of race. Sanitary cordons which refuse entry to Jewish
people solely due to their race (or religion) blatantly violate the prohibition
against discrimination. There was no legitimate aim which would support treating Jewish people differently than any other race or religion. Without a legitimate
aim, there is no need to consider proportionality. However, there was no human
rights law in existence in the fourteenth century to hold States accountable for
these racially motivated violations.
222 PORTER,

supra note 3, at 28-29, 33.

223 Id. at 33.

224 Tognotti, supra note 5, at 254.
225 Rothstein, supra note 28, at 269.
226 Id.
227 Id.; see also Eleanor Klibanoff, Awful Moments in Quarantine History: Remember Typhoid
Mary?, NPR (Oct. 30, 2014), https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2014/10/30/360120406/awfulmoments-in-quarantine-history-remember-typhoid-mary.
228 HowARD MARKEL, QUARANTINE! EAST EUROPEAN JEWISH IMMIGRANTS AND THE NEW YORK

CITY

EPIDEMIC OF 1892, 53 (1997).
229 Klibanoff, supra note 227 (quoting MARKEL, supra note 228).
230 Rothstein, supra note 28, at 270.
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The disparate treatment between Italians and Jewish Russians and the quarantine of only Chinese in the United States were also clearly based on race. While
the ICCPR did not exist in the early 1900s, the United States nevertheless violated human rights delineated in its national constitution. For example, the legislation quarantining Chinese residents in San Francisco expressly only applied to
Chinese residents, and as a result was subsequently struck down by American
courts as violation of the Equal Protection Clause in the 14th Amendment of the
United States Constitution. 23 1 While the quarantine of Jewish Russian immigrants was not tried in court, this discrimination would likely be a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause. 232 Additionally, none of these early public health measures would be a justifiable derogation under the ICCPR or ICESCR had either
existed at the time. Even if the United States could prove a legitimate aim and not
just animus, the measure is not proportional to that aim. There was no reason to
believe that Chinese residents or Jewish Russian immigrants were particularly
susceptible to disease. The only justification was racial propinquity with a person
who had the disease, which bears no relation to a person's actual likelihood of
having the disease himself. Furthermore, Article 4 of the ICCPR expressly prevents derogations which discriminate on the ground of race. 23 3 Article 4 of the
ICESCR only entertains derogations which are solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare, which racial classifications by their very nature can
never be.
Although earlier quarantines were marred with racial discrimination, twentyfirst century quarantines have been widely devoid of racial discrimination. This is
in part due to the applicability of the principle of non-discrimination set forth in
the International Bill of Rights, which is non-derogable on the basis of race. In
addition to the International Bill of Rights, various other international agreements
relating to public health, such as the Constitution of the WHO, have adopted the
principle of non-discrimination. 23 4 Other public health agreements do not address
the principle of non-discrimination, but require scientific justifications, which exists as another reason for racially neutral public health measures. For example,
the World Trade Organization Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures ("SPS Agreement") requires that all sanitary measures
taken by States which directly or indirectly affect international trade must be
based on scientific evidence. 235 Quarantines and sanitary cordons indirectly affect international trade, particularly the travel and tourism industry, and as such
231 Wong Wai v. Williamson, 103 F. 1, 6 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900); Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10, 2324 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900).
232 Presumably, the quarantine of the Russian Jews would not pass the derogation test under the
United States Constitutional system, which requires a compelling governmental interest that is narrowly
tailored. There is no identifiable reason to treat the Russian Jew immigrants any different than the Italian
immigrants who arrived on the same infected ship other than racial animus.

233 ICCPR, supra note 65, at art. 4.
234

Constitution of the World Health Organization, supra 101 <CITE _Ref70582808">, at 185.

235 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures art. 2, 1 2, Apr. 15, 1994,
1867 U.N.T.S. 494 [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
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must be supported by sufficient scientific evidence. 236 Modern public health authorities therefore are bound to more restrictive laws than their predecessors. For
example, health authorities in Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Toronto made an effort
to use only science-based criteria in making SARS quarantine decisions to stay
compliant with antidiscrimination laws. 2 3 7
Discriminationon the Basis of Sex

2.

Discriminatory quarantines on the basis of sex are not nearly as common as
those on the basis of race. There are a few incidents where public health authorities discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation, however it is open for debate
whether or not sexual orientation is protected by the ICCPR and ICESCR. The
ECHR has found that the European Convention on Human Rights, which uses
substantially the same language as the ICCPR and the ICESCR, does protect
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, despite not expressly stating it
as a prohibited basis. 2 38 In the Middle Ages, any sexual acts which were not
intended to reproduce were considered amoral sodomy, but homosexuality in
particular was harshly punished in Catholic predominated States. 239 During the
black plague, health legislation targeted sodomites in particular, among other unpopular groups discussed below. 240 A more recent discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation occurred during the AIDS epidemic. In the first years of the
AIDS epidemic in the United States, 25 states revised public health statutes to
provide conditions under which individuals who engaged in disease-spreading
behavior could be quarantined. 24 1 However, very few states used mandatory individual quarantine as a means to address recalcitrant behavior by persons infected
with HIV. 2 4 2 One example of such quarantine occurred in Florida, where public
health authorities quarantined a HIV-positive teenage boy in a psychiatric ward
because his behavior of continuing to visit gay bars was viewed as a threat to
public health. 243
While it is unlikely the International Bill of Rights was designed to protect
sexual orientation, discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation may nevertheless be considered protected by the prohibition against discrimination on the
basis of sex. 244 Plague-era restrictions targeting sodomites could potentially be a
236 Lawrence O. Gostin & Benjamin E. Berkman, Pandemic Influenza: Ethics, Law and the Public's
Health, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 121, 169 (2007).
237 Lesley A. Jacobs, Rights and Quarantine during the SARS Global Health Crisis: Differentiated
Legal Consciousness in Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Toronto, 41 L. & Soc'Y REV. 511, 521-22 (2007).
238 Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, App. No. 33290/96, ¶ 28 (Dec. 12, 1999), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58404.
239 JOHN BOSWELL, CHRISTIANITY, SOcIAL TOLERANCE, AND HOMOSEXUALITY 289-91 (1980).
240 PORTER, supra note 3, at 36-37.
241 Ronald Bayer & Amy Fairchild-Canino, AIDS and the Limits of Control: Public Health Orders,
Quarantine, and Recalcitrant Behavior, 83 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 1471, 1472 (1993).
242 Id. at 1473.
243 Id.
244 See Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (holding that statute preventing discrimination on basis of "sex" implicitly prevents discrimination on basis of sexual orientation).
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violation on the basis of sex as the same (or substantially similar) sexual acts
performed between a man and a woman would be considered procreative and
would thus not be sodomy. However, prostitutes, who were predominantly women, were also targeted by these public health restrictions. 245 Because both prostitutes and sodomites were targeted, the most reasonable inference is that the
plague-era restrictions were designed to discriminate on the basis of sinful activity, which is not a protected basis, rather than sex or sexual orientation. Furthermore, the International Bill of Rights did not exist until several hundred years
after the plague had run its course.
Although the International Bill of Rights did not exist during the Middle-Ages,
it did exist in the 1980s when the AIDS quarantine restrictions occurred. However, the United States did not become a party to the ICCPR until 1992 and it is
unlikely that the rights in the UDHR were considered customary international
law in the early 1980s, only four years after the ICCPR and ICESCR entered into
force. Regardless of whether the International Bill of Rights protects discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, and whether the treatment of AIDS and
homosexuality in the United States were so intrinsically linked as to make any
AIDS regulation indirectly discriminatory towards homosexuals, these quarantines would be a violation of human rights. As discussed above, quarantine necessarily implicates the right to freedom of movement and the rights to freedom of
association and assembly. Any limitations on either of these rights must be necessary and proportionate to further the legitimate aim of public health. While
preventing the spread of HIV may be a pressing social need and in furtherance of
a legitimate goal, a mobility restriction is neither proportionate to that goal nor
the least intrusive measure available. HIV is spread through very specific behaviors compared to other epidemics which are airborne. 246 Unlike a respiratory disease, HIV cannot be spread by simply being in close proximity to others.
Quarantining those who are HIV-positive only serves to hinder movement,
thereby making it impossible for those individuals to engage in spreading behavior by imprisoning them in their homes. 247 Such infringement on personal liberty
cannot be justified by public health necessity. This type of quarantine is nothing
more than a pretext for illegal detention without any due process procedures as
required by Article 9 of the ICCPR. 24 8 Detention in this manner is more appropriately justified under the criminal justice system than in the name of public
health. 249

245 PORTER, supra note 3, at 36; Livia Gershon, Regulating Sex Work in Medieval Europe, JSTOR
(May 2, 2019), https://daily.jstor.org/regulating-sex-work-in-medieval-europe/.
246 Bayer & Fairchild-Carrino, supra note 241, at 1471.

DAILY

247 Id. at 1472. Additionally, such a quarantine hardly meets the definition of "quarantine" because it
is imposed on individuals who are known to be infected, which is more akin to isolation.
248 ICCPR, supra note 65, at art. 9.
249 Bayer & Fairchild-Carrino, supra note 241, at 1472.
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Discriminationon the Basis of Poverty

Discrimination on the basis of poverty is the most common form of discriminatory public health measures. However, analyzing the legality of poverty-related
discrimination is more challenging than discrimination based on race or sex because poverty is not an expressly protected class in the International Bill of
Rights. Poverty could be protected as an "other status," because it is an identifiable characteristic, as required by the ECHR, but no cases have explicitly held
so. 2 5 0 Presumably for this reason, modern-day quarantines and other public
health measures continue disproportionately impact the poor.
The history of discriminating against the poor in epidemic response measures
dates back to the Black Death. During the 1300s plague epidemic, public health
measures were designed not to protect the general public, but to manage social
order between the elites and the "unpredictable underclass." 25' Health legislation
was intended to restrict the movement of undesirable members of society, including beggars, ruffians, and others who represented threats to civil order. 252 Similar
public health measures during the nineteenth century were motivated by a desire
to stop political opposition. 25 3 In 1836 Naples, Italy, public health officials
targeted prostitutes and beggars with restrictions designed to hinder free movement.254 If poverty is protected as an "other status," these restrictions would violate the ICCPR for lack of a legitimate goal. Quelling political opposition and
maintaining rigid social stratum are not legitimate goals. These so-called goals
would fly in the face of other protected rights in the ICCPR and ICESCR, including the right to political opinion and rights ensuring an adequate standard of
living.
While poverty and socioeconomic status are not directly protected under the
International Bill of Rights, States must be mindful of the underlying cause of
poverty, which may be directly protected. Prohibited racial discrimination and
poverty are intrinsically related. In many countries, socially rejected minority
groups were legally required to live in designated ghettos. 255 In countries where
not legally required, many minorities nevertheless were forced to live in special
districts because they were unable to afford the costs to live elsewhere. 25 6 Substandard living conditions such as those present in ghettos in turn lead to overcrowding, malnutrition, and the presence of disease-carrying pests. 257 One clear
example of racially-driven poverty relating to the spread of the disease occurred
during the 1890s in Lower East Side Manhattan. Jewish immigrants arriving on
ships from Eastern Europe settled the unsanitary and overcrowded Lower East
250 Mola Sali v. Greece, App. No. 20452/14,
eng?i=001-188985.
251 PORTER, supra note 3, at 37.
252 Id. at 36-37.
253 Tognotti, supra note 5, at 256.
254

1

134 (Dec. 19, 2018), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/

Id.

255 Okin, supra note 137, at 130.
256

Id.

257 Id. at 130-31.
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side. 25 8 As previously discussed, the public health authorities determined it was
Jewish people who were spreading cholera and implemented sanitary cordons
around the whole Jewish ghetto. 259 It is clear to see how the conditions of poverty here were exacerbated by racial discrimination.
A less visible example of discrimination in public health measures on the basis
of poverty is the West Point sanitary cordon discussed earlier. West Point is
among the most poverty-stricken slums in Liberia. 26 0 However, the connection
between prohibited discriminatory factors and poverty is not present in West
Point as it was in the Jewish ghettos. The United Nations Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights and the WHO acknowledge "the powerlessness, discrimination, inequality and accountability failures that lead to poverty
are often politically driven, deeply rooted and not easily remedied." 26 1 In West
Point, the most vulnerable and marginalized groups are among the poorest, including children, women, and disabled persons. 262
Regardless of whether poverty is protected from discrimination, States must
still act consistently with the right to health provided for in the ICESCR. Because
Article 12 of the ICESCR requires the highest attainable standard of physical and
mental health for everyone, impoverished populations are nevertheless entitled to
protection from disease, and may not be sacrificed to benefit the larger population. States may not limit any rights provided for in ICESCR unless such limitation promotes the general welfare and is otherwise compatible with the nature of
the rights. 26 3 Any discrimination based on poverty which forgoes the prevention,
treatment or control of disease in impoverished areas, such as sanitary cordons
which exacerbate disease levels in the cordoned population, would be incompatible with the right to the highest attainable standard of health, and thus would be a
violation of human rights.
II. COVID-19 Quarantine of Wuhan: The Largest Ever Sanitary
Cordon
Sanitary cordons survived the Ebola disaster, and reappeared in 2020 in response to the novel COVID-19 pandemic. Chinese government officials implemented the largest sanitary cordon in recorded history, cordoning off Wuhan, a
city with a population of 11 million people. Like all previous sanitary cordons,
the Wuhan sanitary cordon raised questions about human rights implications and
legality. Although China is a party to the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR"), it is one of the few State that is not a
party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR").
258

259

Id. at 133

Id.;

Rothstein, supra note 28, at 269; Klibanoff, supra note 227.

260 Per Liljas, Liberia's West Point Slum Reels From the Nightmare of Ebola, TIME (Aug. 22, 2014),

https://time.com/3158244/liberia-west-point-slum-ebola-disease-quarantine/.
261 Penelope Andrea et al., Off. U.N. High Comm'r Hum. Rts. & WHO, Human Rights, Health and
Poverty Reduction Strategies, 5 HEALTH & HUM. RTs. Sina. 13 (2008).
262 YMCA Summary Report, supra note 180.
263 ICESCR, supra note 95, at art. 4.
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China's unique history with human rights demonstrates a strong preference for
economic, social, and cultural rights over civil and political ones. Analyzing
China's public health measures in relation to human rights, even those which
China does not support, raises questions about the nature of human rights, their
ethical underpinnings, and how to hold States accountable for violations.
A.

Emergence of the COVID-19 Pandemic

A new virus, SARS-CoV-2, was formally announced on December 31,
2019.264 The government of Wuhan confirmed authorities were treating dozens
of cases of the novel respiratory disease, COVID-19, which resulted from the
SARS-CoV-2 virus.26 5 SARS-CoV-2 spread through respiratory droplets, similar
to the transmission of previous disease such as the plague, influenza, and
SARS. 266 The World Health Organization ("WHO") recognized that transmission
of COVID-19 was likely where a person had direct physical contact with an
infected person, or face-to-face contact with an infected person within one meter
and for more than fifteen minutes. 2 6 7
By January 6, 2020, 59 people in Wuhan were sick with COVID-19. 268 Five
days later, on January 11, 2020, the first known death from COVID-19 was reported in Wuhan. 269 This death was reported only a few days before the Chinese
Lunar New Year, where hundreds of millions of people travel across the country. 270 Dispersal of COVID-19 from Wuhan was more rapid than other previous
respiratory diseases. 262 Chinese cities reported cases of COVID-19 within 28
days, compared to 132 days during the H1N1 pandemic. 27 1 Additionally, transmission studies showed exponential growth. One new study, which has not yet
been subject to peer review, reported that the number of people each infected
individual gave the virus to was between 1.6-2.6 in early to mid-January.272
Cases began to be reported outside of China on January 20, 2020, including
cases in Japan, South Korea, Thailand and the United States. 27 3 On January 23,
264 Derrick Bryson Taylor, A Timeline of the Coronavirus Pandemic, N.Y. TrMEs
https://www.nytimes.com/article/coronavirus-timeline.html.
265
266

Id.
How Coronavirus Spreads,

(Aug. 6, 2020),

CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Oct. 28, 2020), https://

www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/how-covid-spreads.html
2021); Pitlik, supra note 196; Raoult, supra note 196.

(last visited Mar. 20,

267 WHO, CONSIDERATIONS FOR QUARANTINE OF CONTACTS OF COVID-19 CASES: INTERIM GUIDANCE

2, (Aug. 19, 2020), https://www.who.int/publications-detail-redirect/considerations-for-quarantine-of-individuals-in-the-context-of-containment-for-coronavirus-disease-(covid-19).
268 Sui-Lee Wee & Vivian Wang, China Grapples With Mystery Pneumonia-Like Illness, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/06/world/asia/china-SARS-pneumonialike.html.
269 Taylor, supra note 264.
270

Id.

271 Huaiyu Tian et al., An investigation of transmission control measures during the first 50 days of
the COVID-19 epidemic in China, 368 SCI. 638, 639 (2020).
272 Adam J Kucharski et al., Early dynamics of transmission and control of COVID-19: a mathematical modelling study, 20 LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASES 553, 555 - 56 (2020).
273 Taylor, supra note 264.

116

Loyola University Chicago International Law Review

Volume 17, Issue 2

New Diseases Call For .

.

. Archaic Responses?

2020, the Chinese government imposed a sanitary cordon around the entire city
of Wuhan, impacting 11 million residents. 274 However, before the sanitary cordon of Wuhan, an estimated seven million people traveled from Wuhan in January. 275 On the date the sanitary cordon was enacted, 17 COVID-19 deaths had
been recorded, and 570 cases had been reported, including cases in Taiwan, Japan, Thailand, South Korea and the United States. 276 One week later, on January
30, 2020, the WHO formally declared COVID-19 a public health emergency of
international concern. 2 77
1.

Chinese Sanitary Cordon of Wuhan

On January 23, 2020, China instituted the largest sanitary cordon ever attempted in history, quarantining a city of more than 11 million people. 278 All
flights and passenger train services out of Wuhan stopped and all public transportation shut down. 279 Chinese authorities announced the sanitary cordon mere
hours before it took effect.28 0 As a result of little advance warning, the sanitary
cordon locked-in not only Wuhan residents, but also anyone who happened to be
in the city at the time, including tourists. 28' The sanitary cordon lasted 76 days,
and only lifted after no new COVID-19 deaths were reported in all of China. 282
Quickly after the lockdown announcement, the hashtag "Wuhan is sealed off'
(translated to English) was a trending topic on Weibo, a Chinese social media
website. 2 83 While many Chinese users were supportive of the lockdown, others,
particularly those in Wuhan, were deeply concerned about their fates. 284 In addition to sealing off the city with a sanitary cordon, public health authorities implemented personal preventative actions, such as encouraging residents to stay home
as much as possible, canceling large public events, closing libraries, museums
and workplaces, and extending school holidays to prevent children returning to
274 Id.; see also Coronavirus: Wuhan shuts public transport over outbreak, BBC Ni-ws (Jan. 23,
2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-51215348.
275 Jin Wu et al., How the Virus Got Out, N.Y. TiMus (Mar. 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2020/03/22/world/coronavirus-spread.html.
276 Taylor, supra note 264.
277 Id.
278 Michael Levenson, Scale of China's Wuhan Shutdown Is Believed to Be Without Precedent, N.Y.
TnMEs (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/22/world/asia/coronavirus-quarantineshistory.html.
279 Coronavirus: Wuhan shuts public transport over outbreak, supra note 274.

280 Amy Qin & Vivian Wang, Wuhan, Center of Coronavirus Outbreak, Is Being Cut Off by Chinese
Authorities, N.Y. TiMtms (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/22/world/asia/chinacoronavirus-travel.html.
281 Emily Feng & Amy Cheng, As China's Wuhan Ends ts Long Quarantine, Residents Feel a Mix of
Joy and Fear, NPR (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/04/08/829574902/as-chinas-wuhan-endsits-long-quarantine-residents-feel-a-mix-of-joy-and-fear#:-:text=live%20Sessions-,As%20China' s
%20Wuhan%2OEnds%20lts%2OLong%2OQuarantine%2C%20Residents%20Feel%20A,country
%20and%20overwhelmed%20health%20systems.
282 Id.
283 Coronavirus: Wuhan shuts public transport over outbreak, supra note 274.
284 Qin & Wang, supra note 280.
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school. 285 Chinese authorities stated that the measures were necessary to "effectively cut off the transmission of the virus, resolutely curb the spread of the epidemic, and ensure the safety and health of the people." 2 16
China was not the only State to impose a sanitary cordon in response to
COVID-19, as parts of northern Italy were also cordoned. 287 One month after
Wuhan's cordon, on February 23, Italian authorities implemented a sanitary cordon around the Lodi and Paduan area in northern Italy. 288 These cordons were
guarded by mixed patrols of police and armed forces which prevented all people
from entering or exiting the so-called "red zones." 289 The sanitary cordons in
northern Italy also implicate human rights but in a less extreme manner. The "red
zone" cordons lasted for two weeks, as opposed to 76 days, and impacted a total
of 55,000 people, as opposed to 11 million. 2 90 Although Italy also implemented
questionable sanitary cordons during the COVID-19 pandemic, this paper will
focus only on the Wuhan Sanitary Cordon, as the largest cordon in recorded
history.
Effectiveness of the Wuhan Sanitary Cordon

2.

The WHO breaks public health and social measures in response to COVID-19
into five categories: personal protective measures, environmental measures, surveillance and response measures, physical distancing measures, and international
travel related measures. 29 1 Surveillance and response measures are implemented
by public health authorities and include contract tracing, isolation for the infected, and quarantine for those with contact with the infected. 292 Physical distancing measures are also implemented by public health authorities and include
limiting size of gatherings, and putting into effect domestic movement restrictions. 2 93 A sanitary cordon would thus be a combination of a surveillance and
response measure and a physical distancing measure.
285 David Cyranoski, What China's CoronavirusResponse Can Teach the Rest of the World, NATURE
(Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-00741-x#ref-CR3.
286 Qin & Wang, supra note 280.
287 See Si chiude la "zona rossa ": 43 varchi tra Lodi e Padova presiediatida 500 uomini, LA STAMPA
(Feb. 23, 2020), https://www.lastampa.it/milano/2020/02/23/news/coronavirus-nessun-blindato-nellazona-rossa-del-lodigiano-ma-vigilanza-diffusa-dei-carabinieri-e-unita-mobile-coi-medici-dell-arma1.38506501.
288 Id.
289 Id.

290 Rozina Sini, Coronavirus: Quarantined Inside Italy's Red Zone, BBC NEws (Feb. 28, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-51651099.
291 WHO Interim Guidance, Considerationsfor Implementing and Adjusting Public Health and Social
Measures in the Context of COVID-19, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Nov. 4, 2020), https://www.who.int/publi-

cations/i/item/considerations-in-adjusting-public-health-and-social-measures-in-the-context-of-covid-19interim-guidance.
292 Id.
293 Id.
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WHO guidance recommended all public health and social measures be based
on proven effectiveness and an evidence-based assessment. 294 The guidance further advised that measures which restrict travel should be based on an additional
assessment of transmission levels and health system capacities. 29 5 The WHO
only recommended stringent movement restrictions for "Situation Level 4," the
highest level, where there is "uncontrolled epidemic with limited or no additional
health system response available, thus requiring extensive measures to avoid
overwhelming of health services and substantial excess morbidity and mortality." 296 Stringent movement restrictions even under the highest situation level
must be: (1) geographically limited to where needed, (2) time-bound, and (3)
aimed to be as short as reasonably possible. 297 Furthermore, the WHO, along
with other international organizations, released a guide which states that quarantine should only be used on those who have clearly established exposure to an
infected person and that mere geographical relation to areas with reported cases
is not a permissible criteria for quarantine regulations. 298 Although the WHO
congratulated China on its "unique and unprecedented public health response," it
is clear that the sanitary cordon of Wuhan far exceeds WHO's recommendations. 299 In addition to blatantly violating WHO recommendations, the sanitary
cordon of Wuhan's effectiveness was so marginal that its resulting harm greatly
outweighed its benefit.
The Sacrifice of Wuhan Residents

a.

The reverse sanitary cordon around Wuhan displayed a clear decision to sacrifice of the citizens of Wuhan in favor of the rest of China. 300 Similar justifications underpinned the reverse sanitary cordon of Eyam during the plague and
West Point during Ebola. Similar to Eyam and West Point, mortality was worse
inside of the sanitary cordon than in the rest of the country. On February 25,
2020, mortality rate in Wuhan was around 3%, while the mortality rate in other
294

Id.

295

Id.

296

Id.

Id.
298 IASC Interim Guidance, Public Health and Social Measures for COVID-19 Preparednessand
Response in Low Capacity and Humanitarian Settings, Version 1, INTER-AGENCY STANDING CoMM.
(May 2020).
299 The guidelines cited were not in existence on January 23, 2020 and, in fact, the WHO did not
declare a public health emergency until January 30, 2020. However, these guidelines are useful to refer to
when discussing efficacy of the sanitary cordon, particularly in light of WHO purported "support" of
China's measures. See Cyranoski, supra note 285.
300 The idea of sacrificing oneself for the national good is deeply engrained in Chinese culture, but
nevertheless implicates human rights questions. To evidence this pervasive attitude, one doctor at Third
People's Hospital in Shenzhen stated, "some may say Hubei, [the larger province Wuhan is part of], was
sacrificed, but it did effectively stem the spread to elsewhere." Claire Che et al., China Sacrifices a
Province to Save the World From Coronavirus, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Feb. 5, 2020), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-02-05/china-sacrifices-a-province-to-save-the-world-fromcoronavirus.
297
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Chinese provinces was 0.7%.301 One study found a potential association between
COVID-19 and health-care resource availability. 30 2 The study associated the
higher mortality rate in Wuhan with the insufficiency of health-care resources
due to the high levels of infection in the city. 303
News outlets in February, 2020, reported that deliveries from outside of the
Hubei province were slowed by the strict quarantine procedures, leading to supply shortages in Hubei hospitals. 304 Between January 23 and February 4, 2020,
the number of COVID-19 deaths grew exponentially in the Hubei province. 305
An assistant professor at the Yale School of Public Health stated that he thought
it was likely that preventable deaths from non-COVID-19 related issues could
outnumber the lives saved treating COVID-19 patients due to the overcrowding
of hospitals. 30 6 For example, the Xinhua news agency reported that more than
400,000 patients with chronic disease in Wuhan were unable to access medicine
because of the lockdown. 307 Patients who needed more than just medicine, had a
challenging time even getting to a hospital because authorities stopped all public
transportation. 308 Reports indicated that some patients in Wuhan had to walk several hours to reach a hospital. 309 Those who were able to reach the hospitals were
sometimes turned away either for lack of resources available for non-COVID-19
patients or due to bureaucratic rules requiring a negative COVID-19 test prior to
treatment (for non-COVID-19 related illness), which was challenging to receive
without the patient displaying symptoms. 310 One Wuhan resident summarized the
situation, stating, "I'm willing to accept that we have to stay in Wuhan... but the
medical care needs to keep up. You can't tell us we can't leave, and then give us
second-rate medical care." 311
Marginal Effectiveness of the Sanitary Cordon

b.

The extraordinarily high social cost of the sanitary cordon of Wuhan is not
outweighed by its marginal effectiveness. Studies before COVID-19 had already
301 Yunpeng Ji et al., Potential Association Between COVID-19 Mortality and Health-CareResource
Availability, 8 THE LANCET GLOB. HEALTH 480 (Feb. 25, 2020).
302 Id.
303

Id.

304 Che, supra note 300; Ji, supra note 301.

305 Id.
306 Amy Qin & Sui-Lee Wee, 'No Way Out': In China, Coronavirus Takes Toll on Other Patients,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/03/world/asia/china-coronaviruscancer.html.
307 Cai Yang, Visiting Wuhan Chronic Disease Intensive Disease Drugstore: The pharmacist takes
30,000 boxes of medicines per person per day, XINHUANET (Feb. 28, 2020), http://www.xinhuanet.com/
photo/2020-02/28/cl125640119.htm.
308 Qin & Wee, supra note 306.
309 Id.
310 Id.
311 Chris Buckley & Javier C. Hernandez, China Expands Virus Lockdown, Encircling 35 Million,
N.Y. TiMEs (Jan. 25, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/23/world/asia/china-coronavirusoutbreak.html.
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found measures other than quarantine to be more effective in preventing spread
of respiratory disease. 3 12 A 2011 study found use of surgical masks and hand
washing as the most consistently effective set of public health measures, when
compared to other measures such as screening at entry points, isolation, quarantine, social distancing, and use of personal protection equipment. 3 13
However, some scientists found the Wuhan measures to be effective in
preventing the spread of COVID-19. 31 4 One study found that Wuhan and other
Hubei travel lockdowns averted 71% of cases by February 15, 2020 compared to
no border restrictions. 3 15 The study does acknowledge however that border control is not likely to contain an outbreak, and only serves to delay the spread. 31 6
Another study found that the Wuhan lockdown delayed the spread to other Chinese cities by 2.91 days. 3 17 This study explained that delay may provide extra
time to prepare for the disease, but would not curb transmission once the disease
is present. 3 18 A third study found that travel restrictions, in tandem with early
detection and isolation, helped to prevent the spread of COVID-19 from increasing by 67-fold. 3 19 However, the study concluded that improved detection and
isolation of cases along with social distancing probably had a greater effect than
the travel restrictions. 320 These findings are supported by another study which
asserted that travel limitations alone had only a modest effect unless paired with
other public health measures. 32' Evidence, even when considered in the light
most favorable to China, shows the sanitary cordon around Wuhan only modestly
delayed the inevitable and unpreventable spread of COVID-19 to other areas of
China. 322

It is relevant to note that these studies predominantly focused on spread within
China, not in the international community as a whole. At the time of Wuhan's
lockdown, COVID-19 had already been reported in countries outside of China,
including in Japan, South Korea, Thailand, and the United States. 323 None of
these States imposed a sanitary cordon to contain the virus. South Korea for
example implemented extensive contact tracing measures and mandatory quaran312 ANGELA MITROPOULOS, PANDEMONIUM: PROLIFERArING BORDER OF CAPITAL AND THE PANDEMIC

SWERVE 36 (2020).
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tine for those with contact to a COVID-19 carrier.3 24 As of November, 2020,
South Korea's daily confirmed cases had not surpassed the initial 909 daily confirmed cases peak on February 29, 2020.325 The total number of COVID-19 cases
in South Korea was 27,942 with only 487 deaths. 326 In contrast, the Hubei province alone reached a maximum daily confirmed cases of 14,840 on February 13,
2020, had experienced 68,147 total cases, and 4,512 total deaths. 3 2 7 South Korea's public health measures, which were considerably less draconian than
China's, were over 58% more effective in preventing total spread and over 96%
more effective in preventing total COVID-19 deaths.
Furthermore, States like the United States, which implemented very few national public health measures, illustrate the irrelevance of simply delaying local
transmission by a few days when applied to a global scale. As of November 13,
2020, the United States had 10,637,418 total cases and 242,861 total deaths, despite the implementation of travel restrictions on direct flights from China effective on February 2, 2020.328 Even if Wuhan's sanitary cordon was effective to
slow the spread of the disease in China, it was entirely ineffective in slowing the
spread of COVID-19 globally once it had been introduced.
B. China's Relationship With Human Rights and the Legality of the Sanitary
Cordon of Wuhan
China has had a tremulous relationship with human rights law. Human rights
were built the ideological foundation that "the inherent dignity [emphasis added]
and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world." 329 Originally annunciated
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") in 1948, the concept of
universal human rights likewise emanated through the ICCPR and the
ICESCR. 330 Human rights under a universalist theory attach at birth by virtue of
being human, without regard to country of origin, social status, or any other characteristic. 331 Universalism is supported by natural law and Descartes' theory of
324 Alexander Klimburg et al., Pandemic Mitigation in the DigitalAge, THE HAGUE CTR. FOR STRATEGIC
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328 Covid in the U.S.: Latest Map and Case Count, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2020), https://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/coronavirus-us-cases.htm; See also Steve Eder et al., 430,000
People Have Traveled From China to U.S. Since Coronavirus Surfaced, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/04/us/coronavirus-china-travel-restrictions.html.
329 UDHR, supra note 63, at Preamble.
330 Similar language is also present in the ICESCR and ICCPR, which state "recognizing that these
rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person" (emphasis added). ICCPR Preamble;
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rationalism. 332 Natural law seemingly provides the most support for universalism
as a body of unwavering moral principles, including the inalienable rights
granted to all humans, that stem from divinity itself.333 Divine-created law is of
the highest order, and thus trump all human-made law to the extent these laws are
incompatible with natural law. 3 3 4 Descartes' theory of rationalism supports individually held human rights as a result of the unique ability of humans to think
rationally and logically rather than from divine origins of humans. 335
Although the International Bill of Human Rights is based on universalist principles, these principles are not accepted by all States, including State parties. The
primary critics are cultural relativists, who believe the imposition of universal
human rights is a form of Western imperialism. 336 Cultural relativists claim universal human rights are impossible in a world with diverse moral codes, religions, and cultures. 3 37 In direct opposition to the theory of rationalism, the theory
of cognitive relativism believes that truth has no objective standard, and depends
on a number of factors. 338 Some relativists further argue that morality depends on
social construct, which varies from culture to culture. 339 Others argue situational
relativism, where universal rights cannot possibly exist when right and wrong
depends on the situational context and cannot be peremptory. 340
China is a predominant supporter of cultural relativism as it relates to human
rights. 34 1 Despite Chang Peng-Chun, a Chinese diplomat and Confucian scholar,
having a central role in drafting the UDHR, China routinely refuses to recognize
the universality of human rights. 342 Prior to 2006, China prominently promoted
the idea that universal rights were an impermissible form of Western imperialism. The night before the 1993 UN Conference on Human Rights, China along
with a group of Asian nations adopted the Bangkok Declaration, which urged the
international community to consider cultural differences when considering
human rights. 343 At the conference itself, a delegation led by China, Syria and
Iran challenged universal human rights as being another form of Western imperialism, which fails to consider historical and economic development and cultural
differences among developing nations. 344
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333

Id.

334

Id.
Id.

335

336 Id. at 58.
337

Id.

338

Id.

339

Id.

340 Id.
341

Id.

342 SONYA SCEATS WITH SHUAN BRESIUN, CHINA AND THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM

1,

8 (2012).
343 Osondu-Oti supra note 331, at 58.
344

Id.

Volume 17, Issue 2

Loyola University Chicago International Law Review

123

New Diseases Call For . .. Archaic Responses?

Although China has become a party to a number of human rights conventions,
it is clear that China nevertheless views human rights as aspirational goals rather
than strictly legal principles. 345 China argues that human rights should be implemented according to each State's social and economic conditions. 346 In a recent
white paper, China reiterated its aspirational view of human rights, stating:
"Different nations have different tasks and take different approaches to

ensure human rights, because they differ in terms of stage of development, economy, culture and society. . . There is no universally applicable
model, and human rights can only advance in the context of national con347
ditions and people's needs."

One relevant cultural consideration is China's political and social collectivism.
Collective and social interests are not only viewed with deference in the Chinese
348
society but are considered predominant over individual interests.
Human rights are considered as a subsidiary foreign policy concern, which are
managed in the context of China's overall interests, including economic growth,
preservation of China's political system, and defense of territorial integrity.349
Sovereignty is of paramount concern. China views sovereignty as the basis for
which all human rights can be granted, because without a sovereign, human
rights cannot be protected. 3 50 Public order is therefore viewed as critically important to protect the sovereign, even at the expense of human rights. 35 1 The importance placed on sovereignty is reflected in China's frequent invocation of the
principle of non-interference when responding to human rights violations committed by other States and also when challenging legitimacy of criticisms on
China's own human rights violations. 35 2 China's role in human rights committees
has largely been to further its views of human rights, and shield itself from international criticism. 3 53
After supporting the creation of the Human Rights Council, China has repeatedly called for the Council to reconsider what China views as an unbalanced
focus on civil and political rights compared to the economic, social, and cultural
rights. 35 4 China maintains that economic rights should be given higher import
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353 Id. at 4 (China used its position on the UN Security Council to defeat resolutions criticizing
China's domestic human rights record after the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests).
354 SCEATS & BRESLIN, supra note 342, at 23; CHINESE MISSION, WIN-WIN COOPERATION FOR THE
COMMON CAUSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS (MAR. 1, 2018) ("the right to development and economic, social,
and cultural rights deserve greater attention").
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than civil and political rights. 355 In 1991, China published a white paper stating,
"It is a simple truth that, for any country or nation, the right to subsistence is the
most important of all human rights, without which the other rights are out of
question." 356
1.

Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

Given China's collectivist views, combined with its stated preference for economic rights over political rights, it is unsurprising China is only a party to the
ICESCR and not the ICCPR. Although China signed both the ICESCR and the
ICCPR in 1997 and 1998 respectively, China only ratified the ICESCR, which it
did in 2001.357 Article 12 of the ICESCR explicitly provides a right to health. 358
China's sanitary cordon of Wuhan was enacted to further the collective health of
the Chinese population. In addition to imposing a sanitary cordon, public health
officials also implemented screening and contract tracing, cancelled large public
events and mass gatherings, and encouraged individuals to stay home to the extent possible. 359 While the decision to impose a sanitary cordon may have exacerbated the situation in Wuhan, there is no evidence such a result was intended.
Public health authorities showed dedication to preventing, treating, and controlling the epidemic, all of which are necessary under Article 12.360 China's decision to enact the world's largest sanitary cordon was yet another example-of
China placing paramount importance on economic, social, and cultural rights
over individual freedoms, such as those in the ICCPR.
2.

Civil and Political Rights

Because China has not ratified the ICCPR, China is not considered a party to
the ICCPR and is not bound to its terms. However, by virtue of its signature,
China has an obligation to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and
purpose of the ICCPR unless and until China makes it clear that it does not
intend to become party to the treaty, which it has not yet done. 36 1 The Human
Rights Committee has stated the purpose and object of the ICCPR is to create
legally binding standards for human rights. 362 Acts which offend peremptory
355 Osondu-Oti supra note 331, at 61.
356 INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF CHINA, THE RIGHT TO SUBSISTENCE - THE FOREMOST HUMAN RIGHT THE CHINESE PEOPIJE LONG FIGHT FOR (1991), http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/7/
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361 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.

331 (China has been a party to the Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties since 1997).
362 U.N. Human Rights Comm., CCPR General Comment No. 24: Issues Relating to Reservations
Made upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in Relation to
Declarations under Article 41 of the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.I/Add.6, 19 (Nov. 4, 1994)
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norms would be considered incompatible with the object and the purpose of the
covenant. 363
It could be argued that China's unwavering claim that human rights cannot be
"one-size-fits all" is in itself an act that defeats both the object and purpose of the
ICCPR because the stated purpose of the ICCPR is to create legally binding
standards for human rights, which are by very design "one-size-fits all." 3 64 Furthermore, some scholars believe that China's track-record on civil and political
human rights do not reflect any intention to be bound by the ICCPR. 3 65 In 2019
alone, one human rights report found significant human rights violations in
China, including arbitrary killings, forced disappearances, torture, arbitrary interference with privacy, interference with right of assembly and association, restrictions on religious freedoms, and number of other blatant violations of the
ICCPR.3 66 The international community urges China to take some kind of action,
and China remains under intense pressure to ratify the ICCPR from various
NGOs. 367 On the opposite end of the spectrum is law professor and lifetime
member of the Council on Foreign Relations, Margaret Lewis, who has called for
China to un-sign the ICCPR in light of worsening conditions for social and political rights in China since its signature. 368
Regardless of whether China's actions violate its duty not to contravene the
object and purpose of the ICCPR, China is not bound to any of the ICCPR's
substantive terms. There is thus a challenge holding China liable for any civil or
political human right violations. The UDHR may provide one mechanism for
holding China liable through customary international law as the UDHR protects
many of the same rights as the ICCPR. International opinion regarding whether
the UDHR is customary law, and if so, which provisions are customary, is
mixed. 3 69 A minority of scholars believe the entire UDHR has evolved into customary law, while others believe that the first 21 articles have. 370 Several States
363 General Comment 24, supra note 362, at 1 8 ("States may not reserve the right to engage in
slavery, to torture, to subject persons to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, to arbitrarily deprive persons of their lives, to arbitrarily arrest and detain persons, to deny freedom of thought,
conscience and religion, to presume a person guilty unless he proves his innocence, to execute pregnant
women or children, to permit the advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred, to deny to persons of
marriageable age the right to marry, or to deny to minorities the right to enjoy their own culture, profess
their own religion, or use their own language.").
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have concluded that some provisions of the UDHR are customary law, but have
been unwilling to specify which. 37 1 There are also States which don't consider
any part of the UDHR customary and instead view the rights therein binding only
insofar as they are in other international covenants. 372 Freedom of movement,
freedom of association and assembly, and prohibition on discrimination are all
rights granted in both the ICCPR and the UDHR. Unlike its historical antecedents, the Wuhan sanitary cordon did not discriminate on any protected basis.
Although the cordon did not violate the prohibition on discrimination, it did violate the freedom of movement and freedom of association and assembly when
analyzed under the ICCPR.
a.

Freedom of Movement

The sanitary cordon of Wuhan, like any sanitary cordon, necessarily implicates the right to freedom of movement. Both the ICCPR and the UDHR include
provisions relating to freedom of movement. Article 12 of the ICCPR and Article
13 of the UDHR provide that every person lawfully within a State has the right to
liberty of movement. 373 China's sanitary cordon around Wuhan impeded the
freedom of movement for 11 million residents. 374 11 million people were unable
to exercise their right to leave the city for a staggering 76 days. 375 The right to
freedom of movement may be limited to protect public health, but restrictions on
the right under the ICCPR must be necessary and proportionate. 376 Proportionality is defined by both the ECHR and the Human Rights Committee to require the
least intrusive measure available. 377 While it would be unfair to hold China to
post hoc scientific evidence which showed that the Wuhan sanitary cordon was
ineffective at containing an outbreak once the disease had left the city, there was
ample evidence that other public health measures would be more effective long
before COVID-19. Studies showing that other public health measures, such as
hand washing and mask wearing, are more effective than quarantine had been in
existence for almost ten years at the time China implemented the cordon. 378 Because quarantine measures had already been found less effective than other public health measures, such a large-scale sanitary cordon could hardly be
considered the least intrusive instrument to prevent the spread of the disease.
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Freedom of Association and Assembly

A sanitary cordon also necessarily implicates the freedom of association and
assembly, particularly when coupled with other social distancing measures and
cancellations of public gatherings. The cordon alone tangentially impacts freedom of association and assembly in-so-far as association and assembly take place
out of the perimeters of the city. Article 20(1) of the UDHR and Articles 18, 21
and 22 of the ICCPR address various aspects of freedom of association and assembly. 379 Like the freedom of movement, the ICCPR allows limitations in each
of these articles which are necessary and proportionate. As with the freedom of
movement, the sanitary cordon fails to meet the principle of proportionality because to other, less intrusive, measures being more effective at halting the spread
of disease. However, the other social distancing measures and cancellations of
public gatherings that accompanied the sanitary cordon would be justified. Social
distancing measures served the legitimate aim of public health and corresponded
to a pressing social need, as required by the ECHR. Additionally, as discussed
with historical case studies involving the freedom of association and assembly,
there is no less intrusive means to prevent the spread of disease than social distancing orders. The World Health Organization recognized the necessity of limiting social gatherings to prevent the spread of COVID-19 even for States with low
risk of community transmission. 3 80 In comparison, the WHO recognized stringent movement restrictions only for an entirely uncontrolled epidemic, and even
then the measures are advised to be geographically limited and aimed to be as
short as possible. 381 The social distancing measures put in place in Wuhan other
than the mass sanitary cordon were more appropriate public health responses
which were both less intrusive and legally permissible.
China's Legal Responsibility

3.

Although the sanitary cordon of Wuhan appears to violate the ICCPR, China is
bound to neither the rights provided for in the ICCPR nor the ICCPR's standards
for limitation or derogation of those rights. There is debate whether China would
be liable for a violation of the UDHR's right to freedom of movement and freedom of association and assembly under a theory of customary international law.
Freedom of movement and freedom of association may be customary law, although this is not a uniform opinion. 382 However, both rights are derogable under
relevant treaty regimes, which would counter any claim that these rights are nonderogable under customary law.
The history of public health measures in response to pandemics, dating back to
the 14th century, shows that States have a long record of imposing sanitary cor379 UDHR, supra note 62, at art. 20; ICCPR, supra note 64, at art. 18, 21-22 (under art. 18 regarding
freedom of assembly as it relates to religion; art. 21 regarding the right to peaceful assembly; art. 22
regarding freedom of association).
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381
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dons to control the spread of disease. 383 While these practices began before the
advent of the UDHR, they have continued through the 21st century with the
SARS and Ebola pandemics. 3 84 Furthermore, several States along with the World
Health Organization openly congratulated China's public health measures. 385 The
ongoing State practice of implementing sanitary cordons (although admittedly
none as large as the cordon of Wuhan) coupled with international praise China
received for enacting such a measure both support a finding that no such customary international law exists. In contrast, the principle of non-discrimination is
largely accepted to have formed into a peremptory norm of customary international law, but the sanitary cordon of Wuhan did not discriminate on any prohibited bases. 386 Therefore, it is unlikely that China can be held legally responsible
for any violations of civil in political rights through the sanitary cordon of
Wuhan.
When a State clearly violates human rights, but no remedy exists, the question
of how to hold States responsible for human rights violations, particularly when
the State refuses to be bound to human rights law, must be asked. There are two
options: put insurmountable pressure on the State to submit itself to human rights
norms, or do not hold them accountable at all. Neither option is ideal. The first
option could disrupt peace in the international community, potentially leading to
war and greater violations of human rights. The second option requires admitting
that human rights are only as "universal" as the most repressive regime believes
them to be. 387
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This statement is not referring to China as the "most repressive regime," but rather is general
commentary on the choice between using coercive measures or force to enforce human rights or looking
the other way. For example, inaction in response to the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and Bosnia in 1995
implicitly chose the second option, where victims were left to wonder what human rights they possessed
if not the right to life.
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